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BECOMING THE FIFTH BRANCH 
 
William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson* 
 
Abstract 
 
 Observers of our federal republic have long 
acknowledged that a fourth branch of government comprising 
administrative agencies has arisen to join the original three 
established by the Constitution.  In this article, we focus our 
attention on the emergence of perhaps yet another, 
comprising financial self-regulatory organizations.  In the late 
eighteenth century, long before the creation of state and 
federal securities authorities, the financial industry created its 
own self-regulatory organizations.  These private institutions 
then coexisted with the public authorities for much of the past 
century in a complementary array of informal and formal 
policing mechanisms.  That equilibrium, however, appears to 
be growing increasingly imbalanced, as financial SROs such 
as FINRA transform from “self-regulatory” into “quasi-
governmental” organizations. 
 
 We describe this change through an account that 
describes how SROs are losing their independence, growing 
distant from their industry members, and accruing 
rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative powers that more 
closely resemble governmental agencies such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission.  We then consider the 
confluence of forces that might be driving this increasingly 
governmental shift, including among others, demographic 
changes in the style and size of retail investments in the 
securities markets, the one-way ratchet effect of high-publicity 
failures and scandals, and the public choice incentives of 
regulators and the compliance industry. 
 
The process by which such self-regulatory organizations 
shed their independence for an increasingly governmental 
role is an undesirable but largely inexorable development, 
and we offer some initial ideas for how to forestall it. 
 
 
 
 
 * Respectively, Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of 
Law and Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Funding for this 
paper was provided through a grant from the CME Group Foundation, which 
was established by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Trust. 
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Government [should] keep the shotgun, so to 
speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, 
cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it 
would never have to be used. 
 
– SEC Chair William O. Douglas, 
describing his vision of self-regulation, 
immediately prior to joining the Supreme 
Court.1 
 
Is FINRA becoming a “deputy SEC”? 
 
– SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher.2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Observers of our federal republic have long argued 
that a fourth branch of government, comprising 
administrative agencies born of the New Deal, has 
arisen to join the original three established by the 
Constitution. 3 In this article, we argue that another 
branch – comprising financial self-regulatory 
organizations – is emerging due to a confluence of 
forces, which we attempt to identify and describe. The 
process by which such organizations exchange their 
independence for an increasingly governmental role is 
an undesirable but largely inexorable development. We 
therefore offer some initial ideas for how to forestall it. 
Many historians trace the rise of the fourth 
branch to New Deal legislation that created a variety of 
 
1  WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (1940). 
2 Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher, Market 2012: Time for a Fresh 
Look at Equity Market Structure and Self-Regulation, Speech to SIFMA’s 15th 
Annual Market Structure Conference, Oct. 4, 2012. 
3  The origin of the “headless fourth branch” phrase was a 1937 report 
commissioned by President Roosevelt.  Report of the President’s Committee on 
Administrative Management 7, 83 (1937).  See also FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 
U.S. 470, 487-89 (1952) (Jackson, dissenting) (“Administrative bodies . . . have 
become a veritable fourth branch of the government, which has deranged our 
three-branch legal theories.”); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in 
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
573 (1984). 
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new administrative agencies.4 These rule making and 
adjudicating bodies staffed with experts have given rise 
to great academic discussion over the past eight 
decades. 5 Notwithstanding these debates, few would 
disagree that the vast majority of federal regulatory 
tasks are undertaken by the host of administrative 
agencies in Washington,6 and that courts give these 
agencies broad deference in rulemaking because of 
their expertise on matters within their ambit. 7 
Congress delegated its authority in broad strokes 
to allow specialists in various fields, such as finance, 
aviation, and the environment, to fill in the regulatory 
details based on practical experience and knowledge.8 
The Securities Exchange Commission is just such an 
agency. Assigned the task of protecting investors and 
regulating financial markets in the public interest, the 
SEC was vested with attributes of the other three 
branches: it promulgates rules, it enforces those rules, 
and it sits in judgment of individuals and institutions 
alleged to have violated those rules.9 
Although staffed with experts, these 
administrative agencies are nevertheless one step 
removed from the markets and firms that they 
regulate. And because of the realities of governmental 
 
4 See, e.g., Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., THE RISE AND FALL OF 
THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980 (Princeton, 1990); Alan Brinkley, THE END 
OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR (Vintage, 1996); 
James T. Kloppenberg, Who’s Afraid of the Welfare State?, 18 Reviews in 
American History 395 (1990). 
5 Compare RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE 
CONSTITUTION (2006) with Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in 
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
573 (1984); see generally Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a 
Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676 (2007). 
6 Familiar examples include the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), and Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 
7 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984). 
8 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING 
THE REGULATORY STATE (1993). 
9 For a description of the SEC, see http://www.sec.gov/ 
about/whatwedo.shtml. For one of the definitive histories of the SEC, which 
describes these features, their origins, and their change over time, see JOEL 
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (3d ed.) (2003). 
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budgets and the dynamics of bureaucratic entities, 
many commentators argue that the agencies have long 
been understaffed and outgunned.10 This imbalance is 
especially acute in the world of finance, where the 
pecuniary stakes are so high for private parties that 
governmental agencies by themselves have always 
seemed overwhelmed. To give just one example, nearly 
seventy years elapsed before the SEC established a 
division to keep abreast of the latest Wall Street 
innovations: a law professor, not a financier, was 
assigned to head it, assisted by just a handful of staff 
to keep up with the armies of innovators deployed on 
Wall Street.11 
In the area of finance, where this imbalance is 
particularly potent, the fourth branch of government 
has operated for decades in tandem with various 
purely private bodies that also regulate the behavior of 
financial professionals. These member-based 
regulatory entities long preceded any government 
regulation of financial markets.12 Direct legal 
regulation of financial markets is a product of the early 
twentieth century: state legislation first appeared with 
Kansas’s blue-sky law of 1911,13 and the federal 
securities laws were passed from 1933 to 1940.14 
Private regulation, in contrast, is a product of the late 
eighteenth century.15 The early stock exchanges in 
New York were formed privately as early as 1792 
primarily as a means to impose private, member-based 
type of regulation upon the nascent financial 
industry.16 (These early efforts were based on British 
 
10 See, e.g., Sarah N. Lynch, Headaches at the SEC’s Think Tank, 
Reuters, May 3, 2011 (describing the early results from the Division of Risk, 
Strategy, and Financial Innovation, which was designed to keep abreast of the 
latest innovations on Wall Street). 
11 For a description of the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial 
Innovation, see http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-199.htm. 
12 See infra, Section II. 
13 1911 Kans. Sess. Laws 210. 
14 15 U.S.C. §§78a-78pp (2006 & Supp. I 2009), et seq. 
15 For a general history, see SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL 
STREET, supra note __. 
16 STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: 
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practices going back even further.)17 By creating a 
more secure forum in which to trade securities, the 
industry – or at least the members of the exchanges – 
aspired to improve their business by excluding 
unreliable, uncreditworthy, and unscrupulous 
brokers.  
 When federal law did arrive, it borrowed heavily 
from these private regulatory agencies, officially 
christened self-regulatory organizations (SROs).18 
During the New Deal era, the New York Stock 
Exchange and the National Association of Securities 
Dealers both were given a significant role to continue 
their regulatory mission in conjunction with 
administrative agencies.19 According to a leading 
history of the SEC, the SROs “retain[ed] the initial 
responsibility for preventing fraud or unfairness, both 
because [they] could act swiftly and more subtly than 
a government bound by due process standards and 
could avoid the ‘bureaucratic blight’ of too intrusive a 
government police force.”20 
For some of the past eight or so decades, these 
private police officers of our financial system have 
operated solely on the private side of the 
government/private border.21 But the story we tell in 
this article is one of change. We describe several 
 
CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690-1860, 171-75 (1998).  See also Claire 
Priest and Bruce Mann on early American financial law: e.g., Priest, Currency 
Policies and Legal Development in Colonial New England, 110 YALE L.J. 1303 
(2001); Mann, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY 
CONNECTICUT (1987). 
17  See BANNER, supra note __. 
18 For stockbrokers, the SRO is now called FINRA, which is a 
combination of the regulatory arms of the NYSE and NASD.  See, e.g., Speech 
by SEC Chairman: Statement at News Conference Announcing NYSE-NASD 
Regulatory Merger, Nov. 28, 2006, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch112806cc.htm. 
19 See § 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78o-
3(3)(1). According to Paul Mahoney, the NASD originated as a trade association 
of investment banks in 1912. Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23-24 (2001).  
20 SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note __ at 158 
(quoting William O. Douglas). 
21 See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public 
Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2005). 
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mechanisms that appear to be driving the “self” out of 
financial SROs, rendering them ever more quasi-
governmental in nature. Moreover, this process of 
“governmentalization” appears to be accelerating. In 
one of the most recent instances, the MF Global 
debacle quickly prompted a report from the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the 
administrative agency charged with regulating 
commodities markets), which called for reforms that 
would increase the direct governmental role of 
derivatives SROs, such as the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange.22 Whether they fully appreciate it or not, 
financial SROs are transforming into a fifth branch of 
government. 
In this article, we explore the factors that may be 
contributing to this increasing governmentalization of 
SROs.23 Indeed, the MF Global case illustrates at least 
one such mechanism behind the increasing puissance 
and governmentalization of SROs: many SRO “failures” 
are addressed with awards of greater power to their 
governmental regulator and threats of dissolution of 
the SRO, while SRO “successes” are largely ignored. 
This one-way ratchet reinforces the idea that, for an 
SRO, self-preservation may demand more aggression – 
that is, behaving more like the government – within its 
jurisdiction, even when other prudential concerns may 
not warrant such a reaction. 
Proponents of heightened financial regulation may 
celebrate the prospect of more powerful and 
governmental SROs, while those who favor less 
governmental intrusion will lament it. In this article, 
we argue that regardless of one’s disposition toward 
financial regulation, the mismatch between SROs’ 
 
22 See infra, text accompanying notes __. 
23 For other academic discussions of financial self-regulatory 
organizations, see Roberta Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory 
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. & 
FIN. 151 (2008); Saule Omorova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the 
Financial Industry, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665 (2010); Saule Omorova, Wall 
Street As Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011). 
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governmental powers and private unaccountability is 
leading our financial regulatory system towards an 
unstable and unsustainable structure at a time when 
it most requires strength and stability. 
If FINRA, CME, and other financial SROs do wield 
greater authority than their members anticipated or 
believe lawful, legal challenges may arise under 
theories of due process and the Appointments Clause, 
as presaged in the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
regarding the constitutionality of the newly created 
SRO for the accounting industry, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board.24 More problematically, 
however, the financial firms that are members of SROs 
may begin to withdraw, either in spirit or in fact, from 
those organizations, depriving our regulatory 
apparatus of vital expertise in the oversight of complex 
financial transactions.25 
In Part II of this article, we examine the scope, 
rationale, and history of financial self-regulation. In 
Part III, we attempt to understand the mechanisms 
that are driving the increasing governmentalization of 
SROs. In Part IV, we consider the implications of these 
changes upon our financial regulatory system. In Part 
V, we consider alternatives to the quasi-governmental 
outcome by considering other models for cooperation 
between industry and regulators, such as through the 
use of greater numbers of – and thus increased 
competition between – SROs. 
 
24 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
130 S.Ct. 3138 (2010).  See also Richard Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, 
Boundary Enforcing Decisions, and the Unitary Executive Branch Theory of 
Government Administration, 6 Duke J. Const. L. & Publ. Pol’y 1 (2010); Rao, A 
Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v. 
PCAOB, 79 Ford. L. Rev. 2541 (2011); Nourse & Figura, Toward a 
Representational Theory of the Executive, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 2733 (2011). 
25 As described infra at ___, trust is an important element of efficient and 
low-cost regulation, and self-regulation is thought to be superior to adversarial 
government regulation on this score. For a more general treatment on the 
importance of trust in social foundations, see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE 
SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1996). 
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II. THE SELF-REGULATION OF FINANCE 
In this part, we examine the scope, rationale, and 
history of financial self-regulation in this country. Our 
goal is not to provide a comprehensive historical 
account, but rather to focus upon the way in which 
self-regulation fits into the overall scheme of financial 
regulation, and to observe its significant changes over 
time. 
A. The Private Character of Law 
The promulgation and enforcement of law is, of 
course, a core function of government.26 But it is one 
shared widely by private actors. Government and 
governance are not the same thing, and substantial 
regulation of behavior is exercised by non-
governmental regulations or what is commonly known 
as private law. If “law” is simply the set of rules that 
regulate the actions of a community, then law is made 
by families, by firms, by universities, by private clubs, 
and countless other non-governmental authorities. 
Entities and organizations of all sizes establish and 
enforce their own disciplinary codes, often through 
their own legislative, executive, and judicial efforts. 
Private clubs, for instance, write rules, conduct 
investigations, and discipline members with fines or 
expulsion after adjudicating cases. Indeed, this 
comparatively informal exercise of rulemaking and 
enforcement is perhaps the predominant type in our 
society.  
To be sure, all private law operates atop an 
underlying foundation of formal, governmental law. 
Thus, should private regulation prove ineffectual or 
itself violate broader societal interests embodied in 
formal rules, laws, or constitutions, then parties can 
appeal to the government.27 This layer of informal 
 
26 See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of 
Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127 (2000). 
27 Such review is embedded in current SRO models of regulation. FINRA 
is responsible for bringing initial disciplinary actions against brokers, acting 
through its Division of Enforcement. FINRA “hearing officers” act as judges. 
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ordering atop the formal system explains Douglas’s 
shotgun.28 Since government always enjoys the power 
to compel, all private law presupposes government 
approval or, at the very least, tolerance. A discussion 
such as this leads quickly towards the realm of 
natural rights and the nature of the state, but we need 
not proceed so far. For the purposes of exploring 
SROs, we need only acknowledge that as a practical 
matter private law can serve as a compliment to or 
substitute for direct government regulation. As we will 
see in this article, the array of private financial 
regulation reflects much of this spectrum, beginning 
as it did as a substitute, developing as a vital 
compliment, and then seemingly morphing into 
government regulation itself.  
B. Rationales for Financial Self-Regulation 
The logic for the self-regulation of finance is 
based in some part on the rational self-interest of 
market participants. Industry professionals have 
strong incentives to police their own, since many of the 
costs of misbehavior are born by all members of the 
profession, while the benefits inure only to the 
misbehaving few. So long as the few do not control the 
regulatory process, self-regulation could in theory 
work as well or better than external regulation. 
To illustrate the concept, imagine there are two 
types of brokers: “good” brokers and “bad” brokers. 
Further, assume customers cannot readily distinguish 
between the two before choosing a broker. This 
supposition is reasonable inasmuch as brokers purvey 
an intangible service, making it difficult to distinguish 
good from bad through mere inspection. In the 
 
Decisions of hearing panels may be appealed to a 14-member “court” — the 
National Adjudicatory Council (NAC) — which comprises seven industry 
representatives (elected by members) and seven non-industry members 
(appointed by FINRA). (Disclosure: Professor Henderson is currently a non-
industry member of the NAC.)  Decisions of the NAC may be appealed to the 
SEC, and from there to the circuit courts of appeals and ultimately the US 
Supreme Court. 
28 See supra note 1. 
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absence of an ability to discriminate, rational 
customers should discount the amount they will pay 
for brokerage services because of the possibility of 
choosing a bad broker and thereby being cheated.  
For instance, consider customers who would pay 
$10 for the services of a good broker, knowing they will 
not be cheated, but only $5 for the advice of a bad 
broker, who might cheat them. If customers cannot 
distinguish between the two types of brokers, they 
should only pay $7.50 for the advice of an average 
broker, assuming they think there are an equal 
number of good and bad brokers. If good brokers 
cannot credibly signal their quality, they will be unable 
to charge the full value of their services, and therefore 
good brokers are likely to exit the market, to reduce 
the quality of their service, or to cheat. As such, the 
overall quality of brokers is inclined to drop. In this 
hypothetical, good brokers are effectively subsidizing 
bad brokers. Good brokers therefore possess strong 
incentives to identify bad brokers or to remove them 
from the industry, since doing so will allow good 
brokers to charge more for their services. (Assuming, 
of course, that the all-in costs of this oversight are 
fewer than lost profits.) Industry self-regulation is an 
organic part of a successful brokerage industry, and 
government is not obviously necessary to deliver it. 
The logic of self-regulation does not apply in 
every regulatory situation. In some other industries, 
self-regulation may not be very effective. Consider, for 
instance, environmental pollution. Pollution may be 
profit maximizing for firms in the absence of regulation 
because costs (such as damage to the air, vegetation, 
or water) are imposed on others. If no mechanism 
exists to force an Illinois factory to pay for damage its 
emissions do to apple trees in upstate New York, the 
Illinois factory is likely to emit more than the socially 
optimal level.29 The farmers, their customers, or 
 
29 See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & 
ECON. 1 (1960). 
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taxpayers will in turn pay for some of the benefits that 
inure to factory’s customers. Only when costs are 
internalized to the production function, and therefore 
priced by the market, are production and consumption 
likely to be optimized. 
Brokerage and other financial activity is 
amenable to self-regulation because the harm caused 
by bad brokers (that is, ones taking too little care or 
engaging in too much deleterious activity) is primarily 
born by the individuals who are in a contractual 
relationship with the broker. When the broker cheats, 
the customer loses.30 In contrast, when a factory 
pollutes, its customers gain. This reversed outcome 
occurs because the costs of the factory’s products are 
lower than they would otherwise be, since some of 
those costs of production are born by others. Polluters 
therefore do not have strong incentives to police other 
polluters, and thus self-regulation may be less effective 
in contexts such as environmental regulation.31  
Yet empowering “good” brokers to police “bad” 
brokers risks giving those good brokers the ability to 
reduce competition and to raise their own profits. For 
example, there is the possibility that relatively larger or 
more well-established firms might exert 
disproportionate influence on the SRO, and 
manipulate the organization into imposing costs on 
relatively smaller or less established firms. In such a 
way, self-regulation might also give rise to anti-
competitive behavior.  
As an example, suppose that compliance with 
rules carries both a fixed and a variable cost. A simple 
way to appreciate this dynamic is to imagine that the 
 
30 To be sure, there may be some risk, called systemic risk, that 
customers’ losses will harm other customers, but for most brokerage deals, this 
harm, what we might call “financial pollution,” is slight. 
31 There may still be some work for non-governmental regulation, such as 
through third-party attestation about compliance or voluntary environmental 
controls designed to increase firm or industry reputation. The briefly lived 
Chicago Climate Exchange, where firms voluntarily agreed to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, is an example of this. See, e.g., Nathanial Gronewold, 
Chicago Climate Exchange Closes Nation’s First Cap-and-Trade System but 
Keeps Eye to the Future, NY TIMES, Jan. 3, 2011. 
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only cost of compliance is personnel in a compliance 
department. If we make the modest assumption that 
the number of compliance officers does not scale 
directly with the assets under a particular firm’s 
management, then smaller firms will find themselves 
at a competitive disadvantage, all else being equal, due 
to their greater compliance costs. Consider two firms: 
one with $100 in assets under management and one 
with $1000 in assets under management. If each 
officer can oversee $250 in assets, but there is a 
minimum of at least one compliance officer, then the 
regulatory costs for the smaller firm are one, while 
those costs for the larger firm are four. On a per asset 
basis, the regulatory costs are lower for the larger firm. 
Smaller firms in this kind of system must 
substantially outperform larger firms in order to 
maintain competitive parity. In this example, the 
smaller firm must outperform the larger by 60 basis 
points.32 
This handicap in scale is a significant problem 
only if larger firms dominate the regulatory process, 
either through the making or the enforcing of rules.33 
Such discrepancies may, of course, be inevitable. 
SROs are generally funded by fees levied upon their 
members, and these fees are often disproportionately 
borne by larger firms.34 In addition, the U.S. 
 
32 To illustrate, consider a 10% return before compliance costs. This rate 
returns $110 to the smaller firm and $1100 for the larger firm. Subtracting the 
compliance costs yields a net return of $109 for the smaller firm and $1096 for 
the larger firm. These dollar amounts translate to a return of 9% for the smaller 
firm and 9.6% for the larger firm. 
33 Importantly, this is true regardless of whether the regulator is the 
government or an SRO. The public choice literature abounds with evidence of 
regulatory capture by large, concentrated interests. For some recent evidence of 
this in the regulation of broker-dealers by the SEC, see Stavros Gadinis, “The 
SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against Broker-
Dealers,” 67 BUS. LAWYER 679 (2012) (finding larger firms fared better in 
enforcement actions (e.g., fewer individuals charged, more use of administrative 
sanctions instead of court proceedings, and lower sanctions) compared with 
similarly situated smaller firms). 
34 See, e.g., Melanie Waddell, FINRA to Hike BD Fees in Effort to 
Recoup “Significant Loss,” available at http://www.advisorone.com/ 
2012/04/27/finra-to-hike-bd-fees-in-effort-to-recoup-signific (describing the 
current fee structure, ranging from membership to trading activity, and noting 
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population of financial firms comprises relatively few 
large firms amongst thousands of smaller firms.35 
Thus, the large firms enjoy low coordination costs and 
highly aligned interests. Moreover, the political 
influence of larger firms, be it with the SRO, the SRO’s 
governmental overseer, or Congress, is likely to be 
much greater. 
In some instances, efforts have been made to 
minimize this problem. For instance, after several 
scandals, the SEC required FINRA to include more 
members of the public on its board of directors.36 
Similarly, the quasi-judicial body that hears appeals 
from FINRA disciplinary and membership matters 
(known as the FINRA National Adjudicatory Council) 
also comprises an equal number of industry insiders 
(seven) and outsiders (seven).37 Whether these 
governance mechanisms constrain large firms from 
dominating the rule making process is unclear. 
Self-regulation is easily justified if it protects 
investors and maximizes social welfare, but may not 
be if it is used merely to transfer wealth from investors 
to brokers. This “cartelization” problem is present in 
almost every area of broker-dealer regulation. Thus, 
most of the regulatory debates concerning self-
regulation feature contention over which of these two 
forces – the efficiency of self-regulation versus the risk 
of cartelization – is more prominent or likely in a 
particular situation. The problem observers have in 
evaluating the efficacy and legitimacy of self-regulation 
is that the steps to create and enforce a cartel are hard 
to distinguish from steps necessary to help investors 
through the policing of bad brokers. 
 
recent FINRA fee increases). 
35 FINRA has approximately 4300 members, the overwhelming majority 
of which are smaller firms. See http://www.finra.org/ (“FINRA is the largest 
independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States. 
We oversee nearly 4,345 brokerage firms, 163,410 branch offices and 635,140 
registered securities representatives. Our chief role is to protect investors by 
maintaining the fairness of the U.S. capital markets.”).  
36 See infra __. 
37 See http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/Adjudication/NAC/ 
naccommittee/. 
BECOMING THE FIFTH BRANCH 
 
15 
 
Whatever the theoretical limitations upon 
financial self-regulation, no other arena of vital 
economic activity in this country has regulated itself 
for so long or so comprehensively. To those who believe 
that effective regulation is possible only when imposed 
externally or governmentally, the regulation of 
financial brokers stands as a powerful 
counterexample.38 Next, we provide a sketch of the 
history of broker regulation, paying particular 
attention to how the relationship between government 
and private regulators has changed over time. 
C. Evolving from SRO to QGO: The Case of FINRA 
An account of the regulation of stockbrokers in 
the United States illustrates the phenomenon of 
governmentalization that we are attempting to explain 
in this article. Although a history of financial SROs is 
far beyond the scope of this article,39 a brief sketch of 
the major inflection points of regulation demonstrates 
how the self-regulatory nature of financial SROs has 
grown increasingly governmental. This particular SRO 
is becoming, or some have argued has become, a 
quasi-governmental organization (QGO).  
Professor Roberta Karmel described the 
evolution of the SRO for Wall Street professionals  this 
way: “From 1934 until the present, Congress and the 
SEC have struggled to convert SROs from ‘private 
clubs’ to public bodies, frequently exploiting scandals 
to impose governance reforms on exchanges and the 
 
38 In the case of financial regulation, government and private regulation 
are imperfect substitutes for one another. Where one is powerful or effective, 
there less need for the other. In this sense, brokerage is more akin to the sale of 
typical products, where any harm caused by defects is born primarily by the 
consumer of the product. Note, however, that products liability is not an area in 
which we see powerful self-regulation. Although there is widespread third-party 
attestation – for example, the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval or 
Consumers Reports – the law of products liability contains no real self-
regulatory component.  
39 For more complete treatments, see Arthur Laby, Reforming the 
Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 65 Bus. Law. 395 
(2010); James Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the 
Securities Laws, 100 Cal. L. Rev. 115 (2012). 
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NASD.”40  In a recent speech, SEC Commissioner 
Daniel M. Gallagher asked “[i]s FINRA becoming a 
‘deputy SEC’?”41 
A brief history of stockbroker regulation may be 
divided into five major periods, spanning 
approximately two centuries, from the earliest trading 
on Wall Street in the late 18th century until today. 
Those periods are roughly as follows: (1) the Pre-New 
Deal period (1780s to 1930s); (2) the New Deal and 
Post-New Deal period (1930s to 1963); (3) the Reform 
period (1963 to 1996); (4) the 21A Report period (1996 
to 2007); and (5) the FINRA period (2007 to present). 
At each inflection point, one or more of the 
mechanisms we describe below appears to cause the 
SROs to change in fundamental ways. 
Pre-New Deal period. Regulation of stockbrokers 
in the United States arose originally not from 
government but from the brokers themselves. The first 
rules emerged through a private “club” of 
“stockjobbers” attempting primarily to increase their 
value via membership and private rules and 
discipline.42 (In fact, as late as the 1930s, 
commentators referred to the stock markets as “a 
private club [with] elements of a casino.”43) Beginning 
with the first centralized trading in Lower Manhattan 
in the late 1700s, brokers policed themselves in an 
effort to build trust with clients and to eliminate bad 
actors from the profession. As the SEC Historical 
Society’s history of self-regulation describes it, the first 
SROs provided “a refuge for securities traders 
vulnerable to the popular suspicion of their 
 
40 Roberta Karmel, “Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory 
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?,” 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. & 
FIN. 151 (2008). 
41 Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher, Market 2012: Time for a Fresh 
Look at Equity Market Structure and Self-Regulation, Speech to SIFMA’s 15th 
Annual Market Structure Conference, Oct. 4, 2012. 
42 For a general discussion, see BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES 
REGULATION, supra note 10 at 171-75. 
43 SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note __ at 73. 
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profession.”44 From the late 1780s until 1938, these 
private membership rules were the primary means by 
which brokers were regulated.45  
The self-regulation of stockbrokers began not so 
much to fill a regulatory void but rather to forestall 
regulation. In 1792, the New York state legislature 
made contracts for the sale of stock owned by others 
unenforceable in New York courts.46 Accordingly, the 
only way that the growing stock brokerage industry in 
New York could continue to grow and flourish was by 
creating its own parallel legal system that could, 
through private rules, enforce such bargains. This 
early form of private enforcement built primarily on 
efforts at cartelization by brokers. 
Just prior to the enactment of the New York 
stockjobbing act, the industry engaged in nascent 
efforts at forming a self-regulatory.47 Finally in 1817, a 
 
44 “The Institution of Experience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the 
Securities Industry, 1792-2010,” available at http://www.sechistorical.org 
/museum/galleries/sro/sro02a.php.  
45 There was, then as now, some state law overlay policing fraud and 
other abuses by brokers. So-called “blue sky” laws—as in trying to prevent 
brokers from selling investors “the clear blue sky”—originated in Kansas in 
1911, and were adopted by almost every state thereafter. See THOMAS LEE 
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 8.1 (4th ed. 2001). Although 
states retain significant authority to license and regulate broker dealers, the the 
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) preempted 
various securities regulations of brokers. See NSMIA, Pub. L. No 104-290, 110 
Stat. 3416 (1996). Specifically, section 15(h) of the Securities Exchange Act 
now preempts state-based rules on various financial responsibility metrics (such 
as capital and margin requirements) and reporting requirements. See id, section 
15(h). 
46 See NY Laws, 40th Sess., c. 275, §§ 11, 20 (April 15, 1817) (continuing 
in force statute passed in 1792). For a discussion of the laws, see BANNER, 
ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 10 at 171-75. 
47 A few months earlier, the earliest-known effort was published on a 
broadside, which called for “a meeting of the dealers in the public funds in the 
city of New-York held at the Coffee-House.” See Werner & Smith, Wall Street, 
190-91. At this meeting, a group of dealers in government debt, the first type of 
publicly traded securities in the United States, agreed to be bound by fourteen 
rules, including a prohibition against dealing with non-participating brokers and 
a limitation upon the number of securities that could be sold in a given day. See 
Banner at 250-51. This early attempt at cartelization failed after a crash in the 
public debt markets in 1792. Several other attempts to build an exclusive 
exchange followed. In May 1792, twenty-four brokers agreed to fix 
commissions (at one quarter of one percent). Known as the “Buttonwood 
Agreement,” popular mythology holds that this agreement was signed under a 
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group of nearly 30 brokers formed the New York Stock 
and Exchange Board.48 The Board grew and changed 
as the market for securities increased over the next 
few decades. The average daily trading volume 
increased more than fifty fold during this period, as 
the number of securities listed grew from about 
twenty-five to more than one hundred.49 In response, 
the Board increased the formality of its membership 
processes and the rules by which it conducted its 
business. But the Board never acquired a majority of 
the stock trades on Wall Street, with about three times 
as many trades taking place “in broker’s offices, in 
coffee houses, and in the street.”50 In addition, rival 
brokerage associations, such as ones for mining stocks 
created in late 1850s, and rival exchanges, such as 
ones created in the mid-1830s and mid-to-late 1840s, 
rose and collapsed.51 By 1860, the Board “dominated 
securities trading in New York,” in part because its 
reputation allowed it to determine the prices at which 
other trades would happen most effectively.52 
The Board created this reputation in part 
through its creation of a “miniature legal system” that 
included rules governing trading and disputes among 
brokers.53 As noted above, for the entire first half of 
the nineteenth century, so-called time contracts, 
which included most broker transactions, were 
 
Buttonwood tree and that it grew into the New York Stock Exchange. Both are 
untrue, and the agreement proved equally untenable. See Peter Eisenstadt, “How 
the Buttonwood Tree Grew: The Making of a New York Stock Exchange 
Legend,” 19 Prospects: An Annual of American Cultural Studies 75 (1994). A 
third agreement by brokers tried to create an exclusive club, with membership 
interests, for the trading of securities. Known as the Tontine Coffee-House, its 
members included John Jacob Astor and Brockholst Livingston. Banner at 252-
53 This trading group had rivals, and no single group of brokers was able to 
dominate trading during the first part of the 19th Century.  
48 BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note10 at 
253. 
49 Id at 255. 
50 Id at 256. 
51 See generally ROBERT SOBEL, THE CURBSTONE BROKERS: THE 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE 17-18 (1970). 
52 BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note10 at 
257. 
53 Id. at 271. 
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unenforceable in New York. Accordingly, purely private 
law was the only mechanism for guaranteeing the 
performance of such contracts. A majority vote of the 
Board’s members originally determined the outcome of 
disputes: “All questions of dispute in the purchase or 
sale of Stocks” were “decided by a majority of the 
Board.”54 As the membership grew and the number of 
disputes accumulated, subsets of the Board took on 
this quasi-judicial role and the decisions in individual 
cases took on the nature of precedent.55 This extra-
governmental regulation increased public confidence 
in brokers associated with the Board, and thereby 
attracted business.56  
New York’s highest court explicitly blessed the 
non-governmental character of the early SROs in 
Belton v. Hatch, decided in 1888.57 In Belton, a broker 
who was suspended from the Exchange for unsound 
practices sued to recover the value of its seat, which 
was sold by the Exchange to another broker.58 
Denying the claim for recovery of the sum, the court 
enforced the contract between the plaintiff and the 
Exchange, holding that the Exchange could use the 
privilege of membership as a regulatory tool. The court 
concluded that “there is nothing against public policy 
[in this conclusion], for the reason that whatever a 
member acquires is subject to the self-imposed 
condition that his title and the rights which accrue 
from his membership are regulated by and dependent 
upon the laws adopted by [the Exchange], and 
expressly consented to by him when he joined.”59 
Notably, however, the self-regulation of the 
exchanges did not cover the vast majority of stock 
transactions, which happened in so-called “over-the-
 
54 1817 Const. art. 17. 
55 BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note10 at 
272, 274. 
56 Id. at 261. 
57 Belton v. Hatch, 17 N.E. 225 (N.Y. 1888).  
58 Id. at 595. 
59 Id. at 596-97. 
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counter” transactions.60 These transactions would find 
no real regulatory oversight until the late 1930s.  
New Deal period. This self-regulatory scheme did 
not survive as the primary, if not sole, source of 
oversight of stock transactions following the stock 
market crash of 1929 and the subsequent economic 
depression. Although contentious in light of more 
recent research,61 at the time the conventional wisdom 
of the cause of the crash and the depression was 
“unregulated speculation in securities.”62 Accordingly, 
the Roosevelt administration drew up legislation that 
would largely displace the private regulators, by, 
among other things, requiring that government 
employees (specifically the Federal Trade Commission, 
in its guise as precursor to the SEC) approve all 
exchange rules and regulations.63 According to the 
Seligman history of the SEC, this proposal was 
“tantamount to a declaration of war” on Wall Street,64 
and led to an intense lobbying campaign by brokers to 
kill the bill.65 The “happy compromise” reached in the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was the creation of an 
SEC with the power to write and enforce new rules, 
but with the preexisting regulatory apparatus largely 
in place.66 
Self-regulation also expanded in this period. 
During the early days of the SEC, Chairman James 
Landis proposed using self-regulation as a way of 
efficiently regulating the nearly 6000 unregulated 
securities dealers in the over-the-counter market. 
Landis proposed the SEC “help in the organization of a 
self-disciplinary agency of dealers . . . [j]ust as the 
disciplinary committees of the exchanges have been 
 
60 SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 6 at 141. 
61 See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J. SCHWARTZ, A 
MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960 (1971). 
62 SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 6 at 76 
(quoting Franklin Roosevelt). 
63 Id. at 85. 
64 Id. at 86 
65 Id. at 88-96. 
66 Id. at 100 
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invaluable to us in our efforts to supervise the 
activities on the exchanges.”67 The problem of direct 
regulation in the absence of a private supplement was 
“a little bit trying to build a structure out of dry 
sand.”68 
To create the “cohesive force” that would bind 
the sand together, Congress amended the Securities 
Exchange Act with the Maloney Act of 1938. The 
Maloney Act authorized the creation of one or more 
SROs for the over-the-counter market. The regulatory 
conceit was to use a private body’s “ample contractual 
powers over members to take a hand in enforcing the 
law.”69 Chairman Douglas defended the Maloney Act to 
the Harford Bond Club this way: 
 
By and large, government can operate 
satisfactorily only by proscription. That 
leaves untouched large areas of conduct 
and activity; some of it susceptible of 
government regulation but in fact too 
minute for satisfactory control; some of it 
lying beyond the periphery of the law in 
the realm of ethics and morality. Into 
these large areas of self-government, and 
self-government alone, can effectively 
reach.70 
 
Fourteen months after passage of the Act, the SEC 
approved the registration request of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the one and 
only SRO for the over-the-counter market ever 
approved. By offering NASD members a discount on 
stock trades executed with other members, the NASD 
soon counted more than eighty percent of securities 
 
67 Id. at 142. 
68 Id. at 185. 
69 Id. at 186. 
70 Id. at 186. 
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dealers as members.71 Regulators initially wanted to 
require membership, but could not do so until 
scandals in 1983 made that goal more politically 
tenable. 
 Over the next twenty or so years, some serious 
failures of self-regulation appeared. Perhaps the most 
prominent example involved the American Stock 
Exchange (formerly the rival to the NYSE known as the 
“Curb Exchange, as in stocks sold outside the 
exchange floor on the curb) and brokers Elliot and 
Company and Gilligan, Will. The SEC ultimately 
uncovered rampant failures, including the 
manipulation of securities prices, illegal touting, 
bribery, illegal use of inside information, and 
publication of misleading prospectuses.72 The problem 
was not merely a few bad apples but amounted to “a 
general deficiency of standards and a fundamental 
failure of controls.”73 The director of the SEC’s Division 
of Trading and Exchanges called it a “breakdown” of 
the self-regulation of the Exchange.74 
Reform Period. William Cary, President Kennedy’s 
choice as the new chair of the SEC, immediately seized 
upon these failures to conduct a “special study” of the 
“adequacy, for the protection of investors, of the rules 
of the national securities exchanges and national 
securities associations.”75 The Special Study did not 
completely shake the “continued belief in self-
regulation as an ingredient in the protection of the 
investor,” but it did conclude that “industry self-
regulation consistently had been self-interested and 
self-protective, often failing to produce standards of 
conduct superior to those that existed before the 
enactment of the securities laws.”76 The study 
recommended enhanced government oversight in areas 
 
71 Id at 188. 
72 Id at 285-86. 
73 Id at 288. 
74 Id at 288. 
75 Id at 295. 
76 Id at 299. 
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ranging from suitability rules to licensing 
requirements for new brokers.77 
Although the bulk of the Securities Act 
Amendments of 1964 flowing from the Special Study 
focused on enhanced disclosure by firms and a 
breakdown between the categories of listed and 
unlisted securities, they did enhance the ability of 
NASD to deny membership for unqualified brokers. 
(Another proposed provision to require NASD 
membership was not adopted by Congress.) 
Specifically, sections 15 and 15A required the NASD to 
ensure all brokers and associated persons meet 
“specified and appropriate standards with respect to 
training, experience, and such other qualifications” as 
necessary to protect investors.78 
The SEC was, however, unable to achieve several 
proposed objectives, such as the ban on floor trading 
or an increase of the public role in governance of the 
exchanges and the other SROs.79 As with earlier 
attempts at regulation, these would have to wait for 
additional crises to make them possible.  
The “back-office crisis” of 1967-70 was one such 
event. The crisis, notably similar to a paperwork 
problem in the most recent financial crisis, was about 
lax back office documentation of trades. Over the 
period 1964 to 1968, average daily volume on the 
NYSE grew by 265 percent. Reflecting “an 
industrywide loss of control of record-keeping 
procedures,” the number of complaints against 
brokers rose from about 4000 in 1968 to over 12,000 
just one year later.80 According to Seligman’s history of 
Wall Street, this amounted to “the most serious failure 
 
77 Id. at 299-300. 
78 Hugh F. Owens, “The Securities Act Amendments of 1964,” Speech by 
SEC Commissioner Owens to the Practicing Law Institute, NY, NY, Oct. 16, 
1964, at 12, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1964/101664 
owens.pdf. 
79 SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 6 at 326-
28; 343. 
80 Id at 451. 
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of securities self-regulation in the [SEC]’s history.”81 
The government’s study of the problem concluded that 
“the industry concentrated its resources on sales, and 
paid insufficient attention to properly handling and 
processing the business brought in by its sales 
efforts.”82 According to Seligman, “the back-office crisis 
had focused attention [in Congress] on the securities 
industry, and many members of Congress were openly 
hostile to the [NYSE]’s long-advanced arguments about 
[self-regulation].”83 
In response to the crises of the late 1960s 
(including a stock market crash in 1969-70), Congress 
increased government control of and the governmental 
nature of Wall Street SROs in two ways. The Securities 
Investors Protection Act of 1970 created an FDIC-
analog for customer funds held by brokers. In 
addition, Congress gave the SEC the power to require 
any SRO to adopt rules or procedures regarding the 
inspection of brokers and the licensing requirements 
for the industry; to require reporting to regulators of 
brokers’ financial condition; and to require inspection 
of specific brokers.84 
The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 were 
another watershed change in the nature of broker 
SROs. The statute gave the SEC its long-sought-after 
power to initiate as well as to approve SRO rules and 
 
81 Id. at 450. 
82 See SEC, Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices of Broker-Dealers 
(“SEC Study”), H.R. Doc. No. 92-231 (1971). 
83 SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 6 at 478-79. 
It is worth noting that this failure was not something that was obviously 
avoidable in a world of direct regulation by the SEC, a point we will return to 
below. It is also worth noting there were numerous reported successes of self-
regulation over the period. One incident involved the NYSE’s response to the 
failure of the brokerage firm Ira Haupt & Company. Even critics of self-
regulation point out that it “seemed to establish the wisdom of the SEC’s policy 
of deferring to the Exchange on oversight of member firms’ operations and 
finances.” Seligman, supra note __ at 451. As we discussed below, it is likely 
that successes are less salient in terms of governmentalization than failures. 
84 See Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 15 USC § 78ccc 
(1971). 
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rulemaking procedures.85 As Professor Karmel 
describes it, “the SEC obtained greater authority to 
regulate and supervise the NYSE and other exchanges 
and the NASD.”86 The statute also “expanded the 
SEC’s role in SRO enforcement and discipline, and 
allowed the SEC to play an active role in the 
structuring of public securities markets.”87 Perhaps 
most importantly, the statute altered the governance of 
the SRO, by mandating particular compositions of 
boards of directors. The Exchange Act thus provided 
that the SROs must  “assure a fair representation of 
its members in the selection of its directors and 
administration of its affairs and provide that one or 
more directors shall be representative of issuers and 
investors and not be associated with a member of the 
exchange, broker, or dealer.”88 
Just a few years later, Congress further tightened 
the regulatory grip of SROs, by requiring that every 
broker dealer be registered with an SRO.89 This 
requirement had been desired by the New Dealers, but 
it took the various crises of the nineteen-fifties, sixties, 
and seventiesto make it a reality. 
21A Report period. Over the next several years, the 
markets underwent tremendous changes. The growth 
of the mutual fund industry, the end of fixed 
commissions on the exchanges, the birth and growth 
of the OTC markets, known as NASDAQ, and the 
growth of so-called “day traders” brought tremendous 
 
85 See Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 1975 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 179. See S. Rep. No. 94-75 (1975). 
86 Karmel, “Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be 
Considered Government Agencies?,” 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 151 (2008). 
87 Id at 160. 
88 Pub. L. No. 94–29, June 4, 1975, 89 Stat 97, 15 USC § 78(f). 
89 Pub.L. No. 98-38, §3, 97 Stat. 205-07 (amending §§ 15(b)(8), (9) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, Exchange Act § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. §§78o-4(b)(8), (9) 
(1988)) (“It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer . . . to effect any 
transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any 
security . . . unless such broker or dealer is registered . . . .”); See also, Koebel, 
James T. (2010) "Trust and the Investment Adviser Industry: Congress' Failure 
to Realize FINRA's Potential to Restore Investor Confidence," Seton Hall 
Legislative Journal: Vol. 35: Iss. 1, Article 3.at 10.  
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regulatory pressure upon SROs and the SEC. More 
and more Americans became involved in the stock 
market, and increasingly they were using brokers’ 
services.  
Under the chairmanship of Arthur Levitt, the SEC 
began to increase its enforcement efforts on top of SRO 
efforts.90 In 1996, for instance, the SEC, NASD, and 
NYSE conducted a “sweep” of over 100 small and 
medium-sized brokers, finding that many were 
engaging in substandard hiring and monitoring 
practices.91 In addition, the Department of Justice 
increased prosecutions, convicting 17 “rogue brokers” 
in ten states in 1997 alone.92 
But the most significant regulatory development 
involved a fundamental remake of broker SROs. The 
change started with a NASD committee led by former 
Senator Warren Rudman, which concluded that 
“[f]undamental change is required” to “NASD’s 
governance structure” as a result of growth in markets 
and expansion of NASD’s dual role as regulator and 
owner of NASDAQ.93 
Following shortly upon the Rudman report, a 
study by professors William Christie and Paul Schultz 
entitled “Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-
Eighths Quotes?” concluded that there was “an 
implicit agreement among market makers to avoid 
using odd-eighths” in order to increase their profits.94 
This study prompted a 1994 investigation by the DOJ 
 
90 Statement by Chairman Arthur Levitt U.S. Securities Exchange 
Conference Regarding the NASD Washington, DC (Aug 8, 1996) 
91 See NASD Regulatory & Compliance Alert, “NASD Joins SEC, 
Others, In National Regulatory Sweep,” Apr. 1996, available at 
http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/1990/1996
_0401_NASD_RCA.pdf.  
92 SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 6 at 645. 
93 September 19, 1995 Executive Summary of the Report of the NASD 
Select Committee on Structure and Governance (Rudman Committee) to the 
NASD Board of Governors, available at 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1990/1995_0919_RudmanNASD
.pdf.  
94 William G. Christie & Paul S. Schultz, “Why Do Nasdaq Market 
Makers Avoid Odd-Eights Quotes?,” 49 J. FIN. 1813 (1994). 
BECOMING THE FIFTH BRANCH 
 
27 
 
and a landmark study by the SEC, known as the 
“21(a) Report,” after the provision authorizing the 
study.95 The administrative proceeding following the 
report concluded that “NASD was aware of information 
suggesting that its members were engaged in 
misconduct which had potential anticompetitive 
implications and could be detrimental to the interests 
of investors,” and yet took no regulatory action against 
them.96 The SEC censured the NASD, fined it, and 
required it to “enhance its systems for market 
surveillance.”97 In the wake of the report, the SEC 
required NASD to make fundamental changes to 
governance, membership and licensing rules, its 
investigation and enforcement policies, and to its 
procedural code.98 For instance, prior to the 21(a) 
Report, in disciplinary matters members sat as quasi-
grand juries to decide whether to bring an enforcement 
case against individuals or firms. This arrangement 
was a prototypical example of self-regulation. But after 
the failure to enforce cartel behavior in bid-ask 
spreads, the SEC required that enforcement actions be 
made via a centralized department, in the Washington, 
DC headquarters of NASD. The SEC also “insisted on 
new management at NASD,” and it handpicked Frank 
Zarb, a friend of Chairman Levitt’s for the job.99 
FINRA period. After the bursting of the dot-com 
bubble, the accounting scandals, and the series of 
corporate collapses in the early 2000s, another 
important change came to broker SROs. In 2007, the 
SEC approved the merger of the NASD (the 
 
95 “Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 Regarding the NASD and the NASDAQ Market,” available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/nd21a-report.txt. 
96 In the Matter of National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Order 
Instituting Public Proceeding Pursuant to Section 19(h)(1) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions,” 
SEC Release No. 37538 (Aug. 8, 1996), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/3437538.txt. 
97 Id. at part D. 
98 SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 6 at 700-
01. 
99 Id at 702. 
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enforcement arm of the pre-NASDAQ NASD) and the 
enforcement arm of the NYSE into a single industry 
SRO known as FINRA. Efficiency was the official 
justification for the merger.100 The idea was to 
“increase efficient, effective, and consistent regulation 
of securities firms, provide cost savings to securities 
firms of all sizes, and strengthen investor protection 
and market integrity.” According to NASD, additional 
benefits were to “streamline the broker-dealer 
regulatory system, combine technologies, and permit 
the establishment of a single set of rules and a single 
set of examiners with complementary areas of 
expertise within a single SRO.” The SEC Chairman, 
Christopher Cox, noted that the SEC “will work closely 
with FINRA to eliminate unnecessarily duplicative 
regulation, including consolidating and strengthening 
what until now have been two different member 
rulebooks and two different enforcement systems.”101 
The creation of FINRA created a monopoly for 
broker SROs, with both the upside and downside 
effects. As discussed below, this change made SEC 
control perhaps more likely and the interaction 
between the SEC and the SRO closer. As a condition of 
the merger, the SEC required that FINRA’s by-laws 
increase public representation on the board, such that 
now 11 of the 23 seats are for Public Board members. 
In addition, the interaction between FINRA and the 
SEC has increased, perhaps most notably through the 
recent appointment of former FINRA chief executive 
officer Mary Schapiro as Chair of the SEC.  
* * *  
The FINRA story is one of dramatic transition from 
self-regulation to quasi-governmental regulation. 
 
100 See, e.g., “Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-
Laws of NASD to Implement Governance and Related Changes to 
Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm Regulatory Functions of 
NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc.,” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 
2007-07-26. 
101 See, e.g., “SEC Gives Regulatory Approval for NASD and NYSE 
Consolidation, "U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 2007-07-26. 
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Although the transition is not complete, and federal 
courts have not conclusively deemed FINRA to be a 
purely governmental actor, the increasing departure 
from self-regulation is unmistakable.102 Whether SROs 
become fully governmental is a matter for their 
members, legislatures, and regulators to determine in 
the years ahead. That they have grown increasingly 
governmental in the years past is clear. We next 
attempt to describe the mechanisms that are driving 
this transformation.  
III. MECHANISMS OF GOVERNMENTALIZATION 
In this part, we identify the mechanisms that 
may influence the character and behavior of self-
regulatory organizations. Our thesis is that several of 
these factors are increasingly leading SROs to 
resemble the governmental agencies that oversee their 
activities, to the extent that SRO might more 
accurately be dubbed quasi-governmental 
organizations. Over the past few decades, some 
financial SROs appear to have lost much of the “self” 
in self-regulatory organization, and that element of  
independence has been replaced with a more 
governmental approach. We call the process by which 
this is happening the “governmentalization” of SROs. 
By “governmentalization,” we mean a process through 
which ostensibly private activities or organizations 
acquire the characteristics, functions, or appearance 
of government.103 While any regulatory body, be it an 
SRO or a private club (such as a golf club or a 
university), that administers rules of conduct 
necessarily engages in governance, we contemplate a 
more formal invocation of the powers and punishment 
of a sovereign. Along the spectrum of governance, one 
pole may be thought of as purely governmental action 
 
102 Karmel, supra note 74 at __. 
103 We borrow and adapt this term from Michel Foucault. See Michel 
Foucault, “Governmentality,” translated by Rosi Braidotti and revised by Colin 
Gordon, in Graham Burchell, et al. (eds.), THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN 
GOVERNMENTALITY 87–104 (1991). 
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(such as formal charges brought by federal 
prosecutors) while the other is purely private (such as 
the informal rules of decorum encouraged at a family 
dinner table). Much of the operations of financial SROs 
lie somewhere between these extremities, but it is our 
contention that the nature of those activities is 
evolving more toward the governmental direction. 
Government action, for these purposes, exhibits 
several key characteristics that differentiate it from 
non-government action. As a matter of practice, the 
federal government takes action through a highly 
formal bureaucracy subject to compendious legislation 
governing civil service rules and protections. As the 
quotations from William O. Douglas and others above 
suggest, government action is also more blunt, being 
less capable of the enforcement of ethical and moral 
judgments due to the external, third-party nature of 
the enforcement.  
Government action is also uniquely powerful 
because it acts, at its fundament, based upon its 
monopoly on lawful violence and because it is not 
beholden to competitive market forces. Because of 
these factors, government action has been historically 
perceived by many in this country to be more 
potentially dangerous or coercive for those subject to 
its authority. Accordingly, government action is 
concomitantly subject to constitutional, legislative, 
and other legal bulwarks. This array of protections 
from the awesome power of the state establishes a set 
of presumptions that are held, to a greater or lesser 
extent by the public, depending on their own prior 
beliefs, the regulatory circumstances, and other 
relevant facts. Broadly, though, individuals in the 
United States are likely to view many governmental 
regulatory processes as more adversarial and 
potentially consequential than private or non-
governmental process, notwithstanding the panoply of 
constitutional protections. 
Governmentalization is the process by which 
non-governmental actors acquire more government-
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like characteristics; that is, the way in which they 
become more rule-bound, more adversarial, more 
bureaucratic, and, most importantly, more capable of 
depriving their subjects of life, liberty, or happiness. 
Our examination of governmentalization focuses 
primarily upon the lessons that can be drawn from the 
experience of FINRA as the securities industry’s most 
prominent self-regulator. These lessons demonstrate 
forces that may, in some combination, be driving what 
we perceive to be a move from self-regulation to quasi-
governmental regulation, and perhaps eventually to 
outright governmental regulation. We consider several 
potential forces in turn, while recognizing that they 
might act in isolation or any variety of temporal or 
circumstantial combinations. In short, we do not 
purport to unveil a mechanical formula that produces 
governmentalization but rather attempt to explore the 
variety of contexts that may do so. 
A. Possible Mechanisms of Governmentalization 
1. The Nature of Financial Victims 
The first potential driver of a change in the 
nature of self-regulation is the type of individuals or 
institutions being regulated. We should expect the 
locus and intensity of regulation to correspond in some 
degree to the characteristics of potential victims of 
wrongdoing. If potential victims are notably weak and 
vulnerable, we should expect to see one set of 
regulatory actors and choices; while if potential victims 
are comparatively strong and able to fend for 
themselves, we should expect to find another. 
Government has a greater interest in protecting the 
weak and vulnerable, so we would expect this interest 
to be correlated with more direct control of regulation 
by government officials.  
Similarly, if potential victims are not central 
actors within the industry being regulated, then they 
are less likely to be able to participate in any self-
regulatory system, so we should expect greater 
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governmental involvement and greater regulatory 
intensity. Self-regulation is likely to be more effective 
where the interests of those who govern and those who 
are governed are closely aligned. In addition, if the 
potential victims and wrongdoers are easy to categorize 
ex ante, then government regulation is more likely. If 
two participants cannot tell whether they will be on 
the wrong side of a particular transaction, then the 
case for non-governmental regulation is stronger, since 
reputational forces and a balanced approach is more 
likely to arise naturally.  
These predictions are consistent with the 
observed pattern of the allocation of private and public 
law. We should not be surprised to see purely private 
law governing disputes between different merchants in 
an industry. Lisa Bernstein’s work describing the 
almost completely autonomous self-regulation of the 
cotton and diamond industries demonstrates many of 
these characteristics: they are situations in which the 
potential victims are sophisticated, repeat players, and 
difficult to characterize ex ante.104 At the other end of 
the private-public law enforcement spectrum are 
traditionally government-only subjects, such as 
prohibitions on the use of violence or in areas like 
products liability or environmental law. Securities 
regulation, we believe, is a milieu that falls somewhere 
between these extremes, though it was not always 
such. And, it is our contention in this article, that it 
will not always remain so.  
The federal securities laws impose significant 
restrictions on every aspect of the process by which 
companies seek to raise money from investors.105 
Rules mandate extensive disclosures, govern the 
timing and nature of all issuer communications, 
restrict who can buy and how much they can buy, and 
 
104 See, e.g., Lisa M. Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton 
Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 
MICH. LAW REV. 1724 (2001). 
105 See, e.g., The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. For a 
general overview, see http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml.  
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impose strict liability for material misstatements or 
omissions by issuers.106 The regulatory burden is 
enormous. But broad exceptions exist in cases 
involving investors who are wealthy or financially 
sophisticated.107 The border of the SEC’s jurisdiction is 
based on a determination of whether or not the 
potential victims in question need the protection of the 
securities laws or, if instead, they can “fend for 
themselves.”108 In broad terms, the securities 
regulations deem wealthy or sophisticated investors as 
able to fend for themselves, but less wealthy or less 
sophisticated investors as unable to do so.109 
Accordingly the intensity of government regulation is 
strong in the latter case and weak in the former case. 
If the nature of potential victims is relevant to 
the type and locus of regulation, then we would expect 
SRO regulation to exhibit more private-like 
characteristics when the parties are sophisticated, 
industry-insiders, or capable of fending for themselves 
(such as diamond merchants), and self-regulation to 
be more quasi-governmental where the opposite is 
true. In short, the SRO model should dominate in 
markets with relatively fewer vulnerable victims, and 
the QGO model should be prevalent in circumstances 
with relatively more vulnerable victims.110  
The evolution of FINRA, as we have described it, 
is one in which there has been a significant shift in the 
governmental nature of its regulatory approach. This 
increasing governmentalization has developed 
 
106 See, e.g., HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 32.  
107 See, e.g., Regulation D, 17 CFR § 230.501 et seq.  
108 See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 
U.S. 119 (1953). 
109 So-called “accredited investors” are able to invest in private offerings 
that are exempt from the disclosure and other regulations. The definition of 
accredited investor includes, among other things, “any natural person who had 
an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent 
years.” Rule 501(a)(6). 
110 Importantly, as discussed below, “vulnerable” is likely to be a context 
and product specific inquiry. While sophisticated investors, like banks or 
institutions may be “sophisticated” when dealing with plain vanilla investments 
in stocks and bonds, they may not be when dealing with complex derivatives 
transactions, as the Financial Crisis teaches. 
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contemporaneously with two significant changes in the 
securities industry over the same period. The number 
of vulnerable individuals entering the investment 
market has increased and the importance of the 
broker as intermediary has consequently increased as 
well. 
First, the number of individuals investing in 
securities products has increased dramatically, and 
therefore the number of investors who appear to need 
the protection of the securities laws has increased as 
well.111 The number of brokerage accounts has 
increased over 1000 percent since 1980, at a 
compound annual growth rate of about 9 percent per 
year. Specifically, in 1980, fewer than 10 million 
Americans owned individual brokerage accounts; in 
2009, approximately 110 million did so. This growth 
cannot be explained by population growth, which grew 
just 38 percent or about 1 percent per year (or nine 
times slower) over the same period. Another way to see 
this development is to compare individual investment 
accounts as a percentage of the population. If every 
investment account were held by a single individual, in 
1980 about 4 percent of the country’s population held 
such accounts, while in 2009 about 36 percent did.112 
Accordingly, the type of investors who may need the 
protection of the securities laws—that is, relatively 
unsophisticated investors—appears to have increased 
as well. 
Not only has the number of individual accounts 
grown dramatically but the growth correlates well with 
the timing of observable changes in the nature of the 
self-regulation of securities markets. As noted above 
the most substantial changes in the self-regulatory 
 
111 The only way it could be otherwise is if the first entrants into a market 
are the less sophisticated. Although we do not have evidence on this point, this 
strikes us as extremely unlikely.   
112 Population in 1980 was about 227 million and there were about 10 
million accounts; in 2009, the population was roughly 300 million and there 
were 110 million accounts. http://www.census.gov/population/www 
/censusdata/hiscendata.html 
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model occurred during the decade from 1996 to 2006. 
In the period leading up to 1996, the number of 
individual accounts increased by more than five times, 
while it has less than doubled in the period since 
then.113  
Second, the large and growing investment in 
securities by individuals is increasingly intermediated 
by brokers. In 1965, “households” directly held about 
84 percent of U.S. equities, while "institutions" held 
the remaining 16 percent. In 2009, households held 
just under 38 percent, while institutions held the 
remaining 62 percent.114 This nearly 50-percentage 
point increase in the intermediation of the securities 
business is associated with the rise of the mutual fund 
industry and other forms of collective investing, such 
as ETFs and other pooled investment funds. As more 
“average” Americans have entered the investment 
world, they have done so primarily using regulated 
intermediaries. The fact that accounts are more likely 
to be held by brokers for the benefit of individual 
investors rather than by the individual investors 
themselves increases the potential for abuse by 
brokers, especially in ways that might implicate the 
integrity of a regulatory process dominated by brokers.  
The traditional approach to retirement investing 
was through the use of “defined benefit” plans in 
which a worker is promised a set amount of money in 
regular increments during retirement. This 
arrangement admits fewer occasions for cheating by 
brokers or other securities professionals, and if it does 
occur it does so at the employer level, where 
 
113 This data does not necessarily imply causation. It is plausible that the 
change in the regulatory model caused the increase in the growth in the number 
individual accounts. But the timing of the growth in accounts does not fit well 
with this story about causation. In addition, it seems quite a stretch to believe 
that the changes in the self-regulatory model were sufficiently quick and 
transparent to the public that they caused a big change in the investment 
behavior of individuals. The data do not discount the possibility that there has 
been some impact on investment decisions by the regulatory change, say 
through a lowering of brokerage fees and the like.  
114 Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/scfindex.htm. 
BECOMING THE FIFTH BRANCH 
 
36 
 
sophistication and risk bearing are both generally 
higher. The more recent approach to retirement 
investing, however, is via “defined contribution” plans, 
most popularly though 401(k) plans and individual 
retirement accounts, in which individual workers set 
aside a set amount of their salary in regular 
installments, which they can they invest through a 
menu of default options (most of which are usually 
mutual funds) available in their 401(k) plan or IRA. 
Although such plans are governed by ERISA, which 
imposes fiduciary duties upon their administrators, 
individuals (rather than professional pension 
managers) are responsible for investment decisions 
and, accordingly, more vulnerable to financial 
intermediaries who may be determined to take 
advantage of less-sophisticated customers.  
Take, for example, the recent case of Epstein v. 
SEC.115 The defendant-broker worked for Merrill Lynch 
making mutual fund recommendations to Merrill’s 
customers. He was compensated largely by 
commissions, which he earned when customers 
changed their fund allocations or moved assets from 
one fund to another. The majority of the broker’s 
customers “ranged in age from 71 to 93 years old and 
were widowed, retired, and earned low annual 
incomes,” and yet he made recommendations that they 
incur relatively large transaction fees (and thus 
commissions for the broker) by switching mutual 
funds, often into funds with higher fees.116 This type of 
misconduct is unfortunately likely to be more common 
in a world in which average investors, like the elderly 
victims in this case, are directly involved in their 
investment decisions. 
In short, the past several decades have seen a 
dramatic increase in the number of individuals 
 
115 416 Fed. Appx. 142 (3rd Cir. 2010). 
116 FINRA barred broker from industry for making unsuitable investments. See In the 
Matter of Department of Enforcement v. Scott Epstein, Complaint No. C9B040098, NAC 
Decision (Dec. 20, 2007), available at 
www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/.../p037691.pdf. 
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directing the investment of their own assets through 
the use of a retail intermediary. These factors 
understandably prompted regulatory changes, not 
surprisingly in a more governmental direction. 
2. Size of Potential Losses 
The size of potential investor losses is a related 
factor that might influence the nature of regulation. 
For the class of unsophisticated investors—the kind of 
investors described above who have entered the 
market recently—the potential for relatively larger 
losses may be explain a more formal, government-like 
regulatory role. Put simply, the state’s interest as “the 
investor’s advocate”117 is greater when potential harm 
is greater. Therefore, when performing the cost-benefit 
analysis regarding the delegation of regulatory 
responsibility to an SRO, the cost side of the equation 
increases as potential losses increase. Assuming the 
benefits of SRO regulation remain constant, this rise 
in costs will occasion a shift on the margin toward the 
QGO model or even regulatory usurpation by the 
government entirely.118 
The only way in which greater potential losses 
would support the continued use of the SRO model is 
if somehow the benefits of the SRO model, such as 
knowledge, information, and lower enforcement costs, 
were increasing concurrently with the size of potential 
losses. To analyze this, we can apply the simple model 
of punishment developed by economist Gary Becker.119 
In Becker’s model, deterrence is a product of the 
probability of detection and the punishment imposed. 
To compare the relative efficacy of SRO versus 
governmental regulation along this dimension for a 
given harm, one simply estimates these two inputs. 
 
117 See “The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,” available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. 
118 We discuss the rough tradeoffs in this choice below, noting the latter 
may be preferable to the former. 
119 See Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169 (1968). 
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Holding the probability of detection constant, 
achieving optimal deterrence depends on the range of 
expected sanctions. For larger losses, the size of the 
sanctions must increase to achieve greater deterrence. 
Since SROs are constrained in their types and severity 
of sanctions—criminal sanctions are unavailable and 
large fines are rare and subject to recent criticism120—
Becker’s analysis suggests that increasing losses will 
prompt increasing governmentalization.121  
Another factor also suggests an increasing 
government-like role for regulators in tandem with a 
rise in the prevalence of retail investing. As the losses 
for individuals increases, the political stability of the 
SRO model may prove more fragile. To appreciate this 
conjecture, consider a case in which the regulator 
enjoys the same success rate at vindicating investor 
losses, regardless of the stakes. This parity would 
mean that the chance that an investor who feels 
cheated is satisfied with the outcome of the regulatory 
action is constant over time as the amount at stake 
increases. For example, assume the average loss was 
$10,000, but that over time it increased to $50,000, 
and say 80 percent of victims were satisfied at both 
times. Although only 20 percent of victims are 
dissatisfied in both cases, in the second period, the 
expected loss is $10,000 ($50,000 x 0.20), while in the 
earlier period, the expected loss is $2000 ($10,000 x 
0.20).122 Insofar as the unsatisfied or uncompensated 
victims blame the SRO generally for their lack of 
satisfaction, then such dissatisfaction may increase 
pressure on the SRO model, since the unsatisfied 
regulatory expectations are five times as great. This 
discontent might be true, for instance, if victims 
 
120 See, e.g., Fiero v. FINRA, 680 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that FINRA does 
not have the authority to bring court actions to collect fines for disciplinary violations by 
members). 
121 The precise contours will, of course, depending on the institutios and individuals 
involved, since other factors include whether the parties are repeat players and will suffer 
extra-legal sanctions, such as reputational losses, from the conduct. 
122 Beyond this numerical example, the issue could simply be phrased as a belief that 
the punishment was not sufficient. 
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believe that the SRO in question is merely a club of 
insiders designed to protect themselves by forestalling 
government regulation. The important point is that 
even assuming the number of people who believe this 
and the intensity of their beliefs remain constant over 
the period, the increased amount of losses increases 
the likely impact of regulatory failure, and therefore 
increased pressure to move toward a different 
regulatory model. Note also that if the belief that the 
SRO model is biased in favor of insiders increases with 
increases in unsophisticated investment, then the 
expansion of the investment business to larger 
numbers of individuals (as described above) may lead 
to an increase in the number of individuals holding 
negative opinions of the SRO or SRO model generally 
in the wake of investment losses.  
This argument does not prove that all large 
losses can be regulated effectively only by 
governmental regulators, inasmuch as SROs have a 
long tradition of policing very large trades by regulated 
parties. It simply points out that for average investors 
an increase in the expected amount at stake may 
impact the SRO cost-benefit analysis on the margin. 
So, while an SRO model may be clearly superior with 
average losses of $10,000, when they increase to 
$50,000, more deterrence may be necessary, which 
might require greater government-like regulation. 
Evidence does exist to suggest that the potential 
losses for individual investors may be rising. Not only 
has the number of individuals investing increased 
sharply, but the total amount of money invested in 
securities markets has as well. In 1965, the total value 
of U.S. equities held by Americans in individual 
accounts was $735 billion or about $4,946 billion in 
2009 dollars.123 In 2009, the total value of U.S. 
equities was $20,451 billion (down from a pre-collapse 
high of over $25,577 billion).124 This growth amounts 
 
123 See Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/scfindex.htm. 
124 Id. 
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to more than a 500 percent increase in the value of 
accounts held by the public. Investing in securities 
has become much more important to Americans over 
this time, and so too have the regulatory stakes.  
Evidence also exists to suggest that the relative 
importance of securities investing has increased as 
well. Over the past three decades, households have 
shifted more of their liquid assets (that is, assets 
excluding real estate and other real property) from 
cash and government securities into equity 
investments. In 1980, cash or cash-like assets125 
constituted about 58 percent of total liquid financial 
assets; by 2009, they had fallen to only 36 percent.126 
Or, looking at the data another way, in 1975, U.S. 
households held most of their liquid assets in bank 
deposits (51%), but by 2009, they held those liquid 
assets overwhelmingly in "securities products" 
(73%).127 
This reallocation means that more average 
investors find themselves in the equities market, and 
that the stakes for them of effective regulation are 
higher than they were in the past. With personal 
financial stakes that much higher, we should not be 
surprised to find regulators pursuing an increasingly 
stringent – or governmental – role in order, as they see 
it, to vindicate investor preferences and to ensure well-
functioning markets more effectively 
3. One-way Ratchet I: The Financial Industry 
One justification for reducing the self in SROs 
may come from industry participants who respond 
rationally to failures of the regulatory system. Failures 
appear to trigger a one-way ratchet that increasingly 
moves the regulatory system away from control by the 
 
125 This number is the sum of bank deposits plus US government securities plus 
money market funds. 
126 The data are from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/relases/Z1/;Table L.213CorporateEquities. 
127 See id. p. 64 
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industry toward the direction of government-like 
control. 
This phenomenon is illustrated by the selfish 
rationale for regulation. In a world in which investors 
cannot readily distinguish between “good” and “bad” 
brokers before choosing one, perversely, good brokers 
are worse off and bad brokers better off. But if good 
brokers can somehow differentiate themselves in 
advance, they can charge more for their services. This 
discrimination might be hard to effectuate without a 
neutral third party to serve as a credible source of 
enforcing regulations that distinguish between the two.  
For members of a particular industry, then, 
there are powerful incentives to oversee a self-
regulatory system that works, even in the absence of 
government. Indeed, in the historical developments we 
have seen in this country’s financial system, the 
eighteenth century witnessed just such a confluence of 
incentives for financiers to self-regulate. Such a 
system is, of course, highly dependent on the 
credibility of its enforcement system. If would-be 
customers believe the regulatory threat is not serious, 
but rather motivated by other goals (such as protecting 
an industry of bad brokers from more serious external 
regulation), then the entire premise of self-regulation 
will be undermined. In such a case, the value of 
regulation is lost, since the good brokers can no longer 
credibly distinguish themselves from bad brokers.  
Such a negative perception might increase over 
time, even if the SRO is very effective at policing the 
market and disciplining bad brokers. Assume, for 
instance, that a given SRO is ninety-five percent 
effective, and, given the costs of regulation, this level of 
regulation is an efficient one. Assume further that the 
remaining five percent of cases that result in fraud 
attract greater publicity and generate more political 
outrage than the corresponding positive coverage 
generated by the ninety-five percent of cases of 
effective regulation. If such an imbalance of coverage 
exists, as anecdotal impressions of media reports 
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suggest, then customers may believe the level of fraud 
is much higher than five percent.  
In that case, the rational policy for good brokers 
might be to increase the distance between the 
regulator and the regulated – that is, to sacrifice some 
of the “self” from the self-regulatory model to increase 
the credibility of the claim that the regulation is 
neutral and constructed to police bad conduct. A 
promise to operate subject to government regulation 
may be more compelling than one to have the industry 
regulate itself. If so, then perceived failures of 
regulation (whether or not actual failures) will tend to 
increase the governmentalization of an SRO and push 
it more toward becoming a QGO. 
The history of the securities SRO described 
above is consistent with this dynamic. Each regulatory 
failure, from the back-office scandal of the late 
nineteen-sixties to the price-fixing scandals 
culminating in the 21A Report in the mid-nineteen-
nineties, has led to a change in which the industry 
SRO has become more like a government regulator. 
The industry might win greater deterrence value 
by fully moving to a government regulator, since 
presumably the SEC as regulator sends a more 
powerful signal about the policing of the industry than 
any SRO or even QGO could. But this consideration 
must be weighed against the reluctance of Congress to 
fund such an expansion and any efficiency savings 
from relying upon an SRO in the first place. In other 
words, the credibility of the regulator as a neutral 
enforcer of rules is just one factor that helps to explain 
the scope and nature of the SRO. The point of the one-
way ratchet is simply that whatever the equilibrium 
position is at a given time in terms of the choice 
between government and SRO, the inevitable failures 
of an SRO regulator (even if efficient) may have a 
rational tendency to push the industry toward favoring 
a regulator that looks more like the government.  
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4. One-way ratchet II: The Financial Regulator 
A similar dynamic may also be at work within 
the regulatory agency overseeing any SRO. The 
successes and failures of the self-regulatory process 
may also accumulate over time in a way that biases 
the locus of regulatory authority toward government or 
government-like conduct. If SRO successes in 
preventing or reducing the costs of misconduct are 
relatively less politically salient than SRO failures, 
then the SRO will face one-sided pressure to change 
its approach to regulation from government overseers.  
To illustrate this version of the one-way ratchet, 
consider an SRO that has one hundred regulated 
activities, and wants to design a regulatory system to 
maximize the efficiency of the regulation (that is, to 
achieve the highest social welfare at the lowest 
regulatory cost). The SRO has two options: Option 1 is 
a characteristic SRO approach, imposing a regulatory 
cost of $1 per activity, a chance of failure of 20 
percent, and a cost of failure of $1000; Option 2 is a 
more governmental approach, imposing a regulatory 
cost of $3 per activity, a chance of failure of 10 
percent, and a cost of failure of $1000. If the SRO were 
deciding in a vacuum which regulatory option to use, 
it might choose Option 1; the additional cost of using 
Option 2 ($200 in additional regulatory costs) are 
greater than the expected benefits of reduced failure 
from Option 2 ($100 in lower expected losses from 
failure). But, if the political bodies overseeing the SRO 
fully internalize the expected losses but not the 
expected regulatory costs, then the calculation might 
be different. Imagine, for example, that the political 
costs of a public failure of a regulated entity are three 
times the dollar amount at stake, while all other 
factors remain the same as in the example above. In 
such a case, from the perspective of the political 
superiors, the benefits of moving to Option 2 are $300, 
while the costs are only $200. The SRO would 
therefore face pressure to adopt Option 2, even though 
it is the less efficient regulatory approach. 
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Several features of the SRO model may make 
this one-directional migration likely. SROs do not 
enjoy full and independent control of their regulatory 
authority but rather now exist as subordinate agents 
of the governmental entities that ultimately control 
their activities. Congress is the source of all 
regulations, though it has specifically created various 
administrative agencies to enforce statutory 
commands and to promulgate additional rules for the 
regulation of particular industries. The SEC (created in 
1934), for instance, is responsible for regulating 
“securities” markets, while the CFTC (created in 1974) 
is responsible for regulating “commodities” markets. 
Each of these agencies, in turn, relies upon various 
SROs to perform day-to-day regulatory enactment, 
compliance, and enforcement.  
FINRA, for example, serves as the primary SRO 
for securities brokers and dealers. FINRA writes rules 
for brokers and firms, though since 1975 these rules 
have been subject to final approval by the SEC, which 
is in turn accountable, to a certain extent, to the 
federal political branches of Congress and the 
president. In addition, FINRA conducts disciplinary 
proceedings, which are appealable first to the SEC and 
then to the federal courts and, ultimately, to the 
Supreme Court. Congress therefore enjoys tremendous 
influence over this entire process, since it controls 
funding for the various agencies, produces legislation 
governing all the parties, and wields subpoena power 
to compel adherence to its desires.  
The recent failure of commodities broker MF 
Global provides a possible example of the one-way 
regulatory ratchet. MF Global was a leading 
commodities and securities broker, regulated by, 
among others, the SRO arm of the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME).128 This SRO structure is relied upon 
by the CFTC, which is the primary regulator of the 
 
128 See, e.g., Ben Protess & Aza Ahmed, “MF Global Inquiry Turns to Its Primary 
Regulator,” NY TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 5, 2012), available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/mf-global-inquiry-turns-to-its-primary-regulator/. 
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commodities industry and futures merchants such as 
MF Global. In essence, the CFTC outsources 
regulatory oversight to the exchanges, including CME, 
which serve as the markets in which brokers operate. 
This delegation relieves the CFTC from having to 
examine the brokers directly. But the MF Global 
failure has raised criticisms of this arrangement. 
 MF Global made a large ($6.3 billion) but 
disastrously incorrect bet on European sovereign debt 
that drove the firm into a hasty bankruptcy. As the 
firm approached insolvency, about $1.6 billion in 
customer funds disappeared. When facts surfaced 
suggesting that this customer money, which CME is 
charged with ensuring remains segregated from the 
firm’s proprietary funds, was used to try to shore up 
the firm’s finances, the incident created a political 
firestorm. Congressional committees convened 
numerous hearings, the former head of the FBI was 
appointed trustee of MF Global, and countless ongoing 
lawsuits and investigations were launched.  
This incident caused the CFTC to conduct a 
wholesale review of the way in which futures brokers, 
such as MF Global, are regulated.129 Both Republican 
and Democratic commissioners on the CFTC made 
public statements suggesting the SRO model failed in 
the MF Global case. Bart Chilton, a Democratic 
commissioner, said: “I think we’ve gone too far in 
allowing the exchanges to be so self-regulatory that it’s 
obfuscated the need for the cop to be on the beat all 
the time.”130 Similarly, Scott O’Malia, a Republican 
commissioner, said: “The MF Global collapse was a 
huge broken window in the [CFTC’s] neighborhood . . . 
[and] [t]o restore public confidence and deter future 
violations . . . [the CFTC] needs to continue taking 
action.”131 These comments and the CFTC’s response 
 
129 Christopher Doering, “MF Global Triggers Regulatory Rehink at CFTC,” 
REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2012), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/01/us-mfglobal-
cftc-policy-idUSTRE8102IV20120201/. 
130 Id. 
131 See http://blogs.reuters.com/christopher-doering/page/2/ 
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no doubt have been influenced by strong pressure on 
Capitol Hill. Leading congressional Republicans and 
Democrats have used the incident to call for greater 
oversight of regulated entities by the CFTC, as well as 
for enhanced procedures by SROs to protect customer 
funds. For instance, Senator Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) used 
the failure of MF Global to denounce the CFTC in 
congressional hearings, demanding an accounting on 
behalf of “folks in Kansas . . . [who] have been severely 
damaged economically by the actions . . . of MF 
Global.”132 In numerous hearings and in countless 
news and opinion pieces, the CFTC has been severely 
criticized for its failure to ensure MF Global’s 
customers were not harmed. 
CME, for its part, however, has argued that it 
did everything it could reasonably do to prevent the 
collapse of MF Global. In economic terms, the CME 
argument is that its regulation was efficient, even 
though it failed to detect this particular allegation of 
fraud. According to the CME, examiners from its SRO 
audited MF Global’s accounts in the days before the 
firm’s bet on European debt went bad, and found that 
the customer fund accounts were “overcollateralized” 
by $200 million.133 CME has defended the SRO 
approach, arguing that MF Global duped regulators, 
and that no amount of reasonable oversight could 
have prevented those who wanted to break the rules 
from doing so. For instance, CME points to an email it 
sent the general counsel of MF Global the day before 
several hundred million dollars in customer funds 
were illegally moved out of a customer account and 
used to pay down a collateral call from a British unit of 
JP Morgan. The email commanded that “effectively 
immediately, any equity withdrawals must be 
 
132 Ronald D. Orol, “Senators Target CFTC Over MF Global Failure,” WALL ST. J. 
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://articles.marketwatch.com/2011-
12-01/economy/30788017_1_mf-global-commodity-futures-trading-commission-
customer-funds. See also http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYIYgX_Yyy4 
133 Terrence Duffy, “CME Chief Speaks Out on CFTC Inquiry,” NYTIMES DealBook 
(Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/11/cme-chief-speaks-out-
on-c-f-t-c-inquiry/. 
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approved in writing by CME.”134 But CME did not 
learn of the nearly $200 million moved offshore to JP 
Morgan until three days after the transfer.135 
Whether the SRO model was to blame or not for 
the violation of segregation rules in the MF Global case 
seems to be a minor factor relative to the political 
pressure the CFTC faces to reform in the wake of the 
event. If the CFTC is going to be blamed for the MF 
Global failure, it is more likely to try to reform the 
regulatory process to exert more direct control. 
Furthermore, if successes are not celebrated in a 
manner proportional to the way in which failures are 
denounced, then the forces will inevitably privilege a 
more governmental form of regulation, even if that 
approach may not be the most efficient regulatory 
approach.  
Perception therefore may appear to matter more 
than reality in this system. Even if the SRO model is 
more efficient, say at reducing risk for a given 
expenditure on regulation, if average investors believe 
a more governmental approach is better, then 
government will have an incentive to make the SRO 
look more like government. Markets work in significant 
part because of trust and confidence, and therefore the 
perception about regulation may be as or more 
important than a purely mechanistic cost-benefit 
analysis that excludes market perception. 
The power of investor beliefs, as channeled 
through politicians, acting for both the interests of 
their constituents and for themselves, is complicated 
by the diffusion of accountability inherent in the SRO 
approach. We consider this factor next. 
5. Misguided Accountability 
The lack of direct accountability on the part of 
various political actors who oversee financial SROs 
 
134 Aaron Lucchetti and Julie Steinberg, “MF Response to CME Edict Probed,” WALL 
ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2012), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304177104577312073753226142.html. 
135 Id. 
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may also drive those SROs toward 
governmentalization. In short, if regulators such as the 
commissioners of administrative agencies like the SEC 
and CFTC that oversee SROs, are politically blamed 
whether or not they are involved directly in regulating 
a failed entity, then they will necessarily prefer a 
greater direct role in regulating the entity in question. 
There are several reasons why this might be true. 
For one, greater control may mean less risk in 
the eyes of the ultimate accountable authority. The 
presence of agency costs means that the principal 
regulator (e.g., the SEC) will be concerned that its 
agent (e.g., FINRA) will act in a way that maximizes the 
agent’s welfare instead of the principal’s. Therefore, 
the principal will take steps to ensure alignment, 
including monitoring, incentives, and punishments; 
the agent may also take steps to prevent excessive 
involvement by the principal, in the form of various 
bonding mechanisms. All of these dynamics will 
increase as the expected costs of regulatory failure 
(crudely, the probability of failure times the costs of 
failure) increase. In other words, a greater potential 
downside will cause the principal to spend more time 
and money monitoring the agent to ensure faithful 
agency. Even so, when the ultimate authority for 
failure resides with the principal and not the agent, 
the locus of decision-making authority will also 
eventually shift to the principal as well. The more the 
blame falls on the principal, the more control it may 
seek to exercise.  
This migration is the insight of economist 
Kenneth Arrow, who described the tradeoff between 
accountability and authority, noting that 
accountability  
 
must be capable of correcting errors but 
should not be such as to destroy the 
genuine values of authority. Clearly, a 
sufficiently strict and continuous organ of 
[accountability] can easily amount to a 
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denial of authority. If every decision of A is 
to be reviewed by B, then all we have 
really is a shift in the locus of authority 
from A to B and hence no solution to the 
original problem.136  
 
Accountability and authority are in tension, and the 
more one party bears the costs of failure, the more 
that party will assert its authority. 
The MF Global story told above may provide 
support for the existence of this factor as well. MF 
Global was overseen by numerous regulators in the 
various different parts of its business, none of which 
was responsible for the firm’s entire business.137 But 
when MF Global declared bankruptcy, it was the CFTC 
that received most blame. Members of both parties 
repeatedly grilled CFTC Chair Gary Gensler and other 
agency officials about the missing $1.6 billion. Though 
of the actual locus of regulatory failure may have been 
elsewhere – or, indeed, nonexistent – the political 
pressure landed most heavily on the CFTC. 
Accordingly, the CFTC exerted its authority to take 
command of the investigation of the incident, which 
had previously been conducted by CME, which was 
MF Global’s most direct, though not sole, regulator. 
CME’s executive chairman, Terrence Duffy, described 
the process this way: “In November, the CFTC 
requested that CME Group not conduct its own 
investigation, but rather take part in the agency’s 
inquiry, and since then we have worked together 
closely.”138 The implication here is clear: if CFTC is 
going to be hauled before Congress to face the risk of 
 
136 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 78 (1974). 
137 According to media accounts, “MF Global had nearly a half dozen regulators 
policing various parts of the firm, but no single regulator was responsible for the whole 
company.” Christopher Doering, “MF Global Triggers Regulatory Rehink at CFTC,” 
REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2012), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/01/us-mfglobal-
cftc-policy-idUSTRE8102IV20120201/. 
138 Terrence Duffy, “CME Chief Speaks Out on CFTC Inquiry,” NYTIMES DealBook 
(Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/11/cme-chief-speaks-out-
on-c-f-t-c-inquiry/. 
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statutory revision or budgetary pressure for this 
perceived failure of regulation, then the CFTC is going 
to exert greater control over the regulation. As noted 
above, the CFTC is currently studying how to do 
precisely that. 
6. Public Choice I: The Regulator 
Public choice theory suggests that the 
governmentalization of financial SROs may also arise 
as consequence of political pressures involved in the 
allocation of regulatory authority. Assuming a 
regulator is interested, at least in part, in maximizing 
its own authority and power,139 then its first 
preference would be for direct control of the regulated 
entities. This arrangement, however, may not be 
possible for a variety of practical reasons having to do 
with congressional preferences about the efficacy of 
self-regulation or the agency in question, the path 
dependence of the industry’s development, budgetary 
issues, or other factors.140 As trading volumes have 
grown enormously (from an average of about 300 
million shares per day in 1990 to more than 10 billion 
shares per day in 2011),141 for instance, regulatory 
budgets and resources have not kept pace.142 
Accordingly, the agency’s second-best option 
would be for the ability to exert greater control over its 
subordinate SROs. This expanded reach would expand 
the agency’s control over an industry in which it may 
have certain rulemaking authority already. For 
instance, substantial SEC resources are spent in 
 
139 Such as though the scope of its oversight, its budget, and so on. 
140 The recently proposed legislation to create a new SRO for investment advisors 
could be an example of this. See Mark SChoeff Jr., “Bachus bill backs SRO for RIAs – and it 
could be Finra,” INVESTMENT News (Apr. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120425/FREE/120429948. Although the SEC 
might prefer to increase its regulatory authority, it may realize that practical constraints, such 
as politics or budgetary pressure, may limit this option. The SEC may realize this and get a 
second-best outcome by supporting SRO it is confident it can capture. 
141 See http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/ 
StatisticsFiles/CM-US-Key-Stats-SIFMA.xls 
142 According to the SEC, its expenses have increased from about $285 million in 
1995 to about $1 billion in 2010. See http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/budgetact.htm. 
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overseeing FINRA and its direct regulation of the 
securities industry. In addition, over time the agency 
may be relatively confident that it could expand its 
influence further by exercising greater authority over 
the SRO. For instance, although the blame for failures 
such as the Madoff often falls on the SEC, those 
occasions also provide the agency with openings for 
greater direct and indirect control over investment 
advisors. We are, of course, considering a public 
choice story. The regulatory agency, starting from a 
position of limited control, may use soft power to exert 
more and more authority. 
The history of the securities SRO offers a good 
example of how the locus of regulatory control can be 
calibrated to reflect prevailing political views of the 
time. When the securities SRO was officially given the 
government imprimatur by the Maloney Act of 1938, 
SEC authority over the SRO – then still the NASD – 
was comparatively weak. For example, the NASD (and 
the SRO of the NYSE Exchange) promulgated their 
own rules, without much SEC review. This 
arrangement was the tradition for decades. But after 
the back-office scandal of the late 1960s, Congress 
increased SEC authority by adding section 19(b) and 
(c) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, providing 
that the SEC must approve all SRO rule changes and 
may “abrogate, add to, and delete from” any SRO 
rules.143 Then after another scandal in the early 1990s 
involving industry price fixing, the SEC received more 
oversight of the SROs, involving authority over 
substantive changes to membership, governance and 
various rules and procedures. These are just two 
examples of the way in which the regulatory agency in 
question, here the SEC, has used perceived regulatory 
failures to exert additional control over the SRO. This 
process, as described above, is commonly available, 
since failures are likely to happen from time to time. 
 
143 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b), (c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(b). 
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Note also that similar dynamic may be occurring 
at a more granular level. Not only might the SEC as an 
entity covet the arrogation of greater authority over its 
subsidiary SROs, so too might the officials working 
within those entities. Consider, for instance, that the 
current Chair of the SEC is Mary Schapiro, who was 
appointed to that position from her role as chief 
executive officer of FINRA. One can readily appreciate 
why high-level officers of an SRO might perceive high-
level positions within the administrative agencies 
above them as attractive promotions. History is filled 
with provincial governors eager for elevation to 
positions within the their imperial metropolises. Of 
course, to earn such a promotion, it certainly helps to 
be perceived as willing and able to execute the sought-
after office. If one wishes to become the head of the 
SEC, success might be more likely with a more 
aggressive regulatory track record, even though a 
lower profile self-regulatory approach might in fact be 
more effective or preferable for the subsidiary. 
What, though, of lower-level employees within 
these entities, who might be more inclined to migrate 
from the SEC to FINRA because of higher private-
sector salaries? Such movement might not suggest 
that those officers’ goal is to make FINRA more like the 
SEC. But that migration would certainly be easier if 
the two entities were more similar to one another than 
dissimilar. Thus, public-choice effects at the individual 
regulator level also offer explanations for why self-
regulatory and governmentally regulated entities would 
tend to converge over time. 
7. Public Choice II: The Compliance Industry 
Another public choice dynamic may be at work 
within the regulated firms themselves. If there is a 
powerful group within a regulated firm that wants, for 
its own reasons that diverge from the interests of the 
firm or its customers, a more governmental form of 
self-regulation, then it will act to enable the process of 
governmentalization. Certain constituencies within a 
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firm may prefer more regulation, more strict or 
bureaucratic rules for a given amount of regulation, 
and so on. This preference may be in their interest 
because it enhances their personal or group interests, 
because it means more interesting work, more 
budgetary authority, more control, or for other 
reasons. We speculate that this dynamic may be at 
work in the dramatic growth of compliance 
departments over the past two decades in the broker-
dealer industry.  
Within each broker-dealer there is a group of 
individuals, known colloquially as “compliance,” whose 
job it is “to supervise the day-to-day conduct of 
business unit activities and to have in place policies 
and procedures reasonably designed to achieve 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations.”144 
Compliance typically provides the following functions: 
to give advice to business units about rules and 
regulations; to develops internal policies and 
procedures that help the firm to comply with external 
rules; to help train business personnel regarding their 
legal duties; to help monitor business functions for 
compliance with legal rules; to conduct internal 
investigations; to handle licensing and registration of 
business professionals; to manage relationships with 
regulators; and so on.145 In all of these functions, the 
role and importance of compliance, as a stand-alone 
function, is greater the greater the amount of external 
regulation. Moreover, holding the amount of regulation 
constant, the more intense, complex, bureaucratic, 
and adversarial the regulation, the greater the need for 
effective compliance. In other words, whether 
compliance personnel are designing training programs, 
offering advice to business units, or handling internal 
audits, their importance within the firm is proportional 
to the governmentalness of the external regulation. 
 
144 See SIFMA white paper: 
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Societies/SIFMA_Compliance_and_Legal_So
ciety/Role_of_Compliance_White_Paper%20(2).pdf at 1. 
145 Id. at 3-6. 
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Where the regulation is aggressive, high risk, 
adversarial, and “other” in a sense, compliance is a 
more vital function than when the regulation is less so. 
Compliance experts are generally relied upon more 
under government regulation rather than self-
regulation. 
Notwithstanding this implicit preference for 
more governmental-like regulation, compliance 
operates within a firm, and therefore must operate 
within the constraints set by the firm. In other words, 
firms may recognize this tendency and exert pressure 
for compliance to be structured and act in a way that 
privileges the interest of the firm (which may be for 
more self-regulatory regulation) over the interests of a 
particular department.  
For several reasons, compliance departments 
may be successful at breaching their firms’ constraints 
in the long term. First, compliance professionals are 
typically siloed in the organizational structure from the 
rest of their business to ensure that business interests 
or short-term profit motives do not corrupt the firm’s 
internal regulatory processes. One industry white 
paper, for instance, describes as a best practice 
“separating Compliance Department functions from 
the supervisory functions of line managers, as well as 
distinguishing the roles of the Compliance Department 
from other control functions.”146 The logic here is 
powerful, since the overlap of regulated and regulator 
in a particular firm may give the firm less credibility 
with external regulators in the event of an 
investigation of the firm. Note, however, that the 
compliance subcommittee of the industry trade group, 
called SIFMA, wrote this white paper. As such, this 
position might simply be an effort by the compliance 
professionals to entrench their interests and to protect 
themselves from the scrutiny of the broader business. 
In either case, compliance is isolated and viewed as a 
stand-alone department. From such a position, 
 
146 Id. 
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compliance may be able to define and to exert its 
interests more easily than integrated departments 
within a firm. If compliance heads in a direction the 
rest of the business finds troubling, the ability to 
control it may be limited by concern about interfering – 
or appearing to interfere – with legal obligations.  
Second, the actions of compliance are likely 
difficult and costly for business managers to monitor. 
Compliance is largely a legal function, and typical 
business managers in a broker-dealer do not possess 
similar training or experience. Compliance employees 
may use their specialty knowledge, the unique 
nomenclature and patois of law, as well as 
unfamiliarity with legal process to insulate their work 
from rigorous business oversight. The mantra of 
compliance professionals – to create and foster a 
“culture of compliance” – is consistent with this 
account. “Culture” is a particularly malleable and 
powerful explanation for a range of activities. Any 
pushback on a “culture of compliance,” as defined by 
compliance, can be countered with concerns about 
legality and a FINRA rulebook that is, as of the 2012 
printing, 1374 pages of 8 point font. 
Such factors as these might still not permit an 
overly independent compliance department, however, if 
business managers of broker-dealers found it 
worthwhile to invest in disciplining compliance 
departments. But there is little reason for a rational 
firm to do so. For one, the compliance departments at 
all broker-dealers face the same incentives to influence 
outsiders setting the rules of the game, and therefore 
disciplining only one department would likely have 
little impact. What would be needed is a common effort 
by all or a critical mass of broker-dealers, which would 
be difficult to organize and perhaps subject to 
antitrust constraints. 
Another reason firms are unlikely to try to 
counter the move toward greater complexity and 
governmentalization is that all similarly situated 
broker-dealers face the same increased cost as a result 
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of the change, and therefore no individual broker-
dealer would reap any advantage from halting the 
trend. All other firms would benefit freely through 
such efforts, and therefore no firm has an incentive to 
invest in countering the push because of the free-rider 
problem. Instead, broker-dealers reasonably may 
perceive increased compliance costs as an industry-
wide tax, which they can likely pass on to their 
customers. Any such burden applies to every broker-
dealer, and broker-dealers have a monopoly on 
executing stock transactions. So long as the firm keeps 
compliance costs within the range of competitive firms, 
there is no business disadvantage, no matter how 
much compliance costs.147  
One final point is worth mentioning. For large 
broker-dealers, not only are compliance costs of little 
harm (if they amount to an industry-wide tax), but 
they may be valuable. If the compliance industry 
generates a demand for compliance services that has a 
large fixed cost per firm, then large firms can use this 
“culture of compliance” as a way to reduce the profit of 
smaller rivals or to create barriers for new entrants. 
Larger firms can spread any fixed costs over a larger 
asset base, and therefore bear any costs more easily. 
Assume, for example, two firms, one with 100 
customers and assets at the firm of $100 each, and 
another firm with 50 customers with $100 each. 
Further assume compliance costs are $50, plus $2 per 
customer. In that case, total compliance costs for the 
first firm would be $250, and $150 for the second firm. 
As a percentage of assets under management, 
however, the first firm’s compliance costs are just 2.5 
percent, while the second firms are 3 percent. If the 
firms pass on the costs to their customer, the second 
firm will have to outperform the first firm by 50 basis 
points to offer competitive services.  
 
147 For another application of this argument, see M. Todd Henderson, 
Justifying Jones . . . 
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Another source of potential competitive 
advantage exists from the development of a “culture of 
compliance.” In a business environment in which 
returns from investment strategies are increasingly 
commodified and asset managers have greater 
difficulty differentiating themselves, regulatory 
adroitness can itself be a source of competitive 
advantage. Perversely, for firms that are particularly 
expert at compliance, the larger the burden and 
complexity of regulation, the better. A firm with a 10 
percent cost advantage on legal compliance can 
differentiate itself more if compliance costs are, on 
average, $1000 per firm rather than if they are merely 
$100 per firm.  
Importantly, this observation does not imply or 
require any conscious plan on the part of any 
individual. The process by which interest groups 
protect their interests, expand their influence, and 
pursue goals narrowly, while being integrated into a 
larger whole is well described in the public choice 
literature, and it does not require deliberate action. 
Rather, these developments may occur unintentionally 
in a manner difficult to observe or to counter in any 
individual case, but with substantial consequences 
nevertheless.  
Anecdotal evidence about the compliance 
industry corroborates such observations. Compliance 
as a separate function began in the 1960s.148 (Before 
this time, compliance with rules and regulations was 
the responsibility of each professional broker. 
Although this is still true, the responsibility is now 
shared with a separate department focused entirely on 
rules.) Over the next three decades or so, the 
compliance industry remained relatively small, with 
even the largest broker dealers employing only a few 
individuals devoted to a separate compliance function. 
In part, this kind of slow growth can simply be 
explained by a rise in the size of the typical firm and 
 
148 Id. at 1. 
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the increasing complexity of its operations. But, 
according to interviews with compliance officers at 
large broker-dealers, starting in the mid-1990s, the 
number of compliance officers began to boom. At one 
large broker-dealer, just a handful of compliance 
officers worked in 1995, while today there are over 400 
individuals. The timing of this explosion corresponds 
quite well with our account of the increasing 
governmentalization of the SROs for broker-dealers. 
The thrust of our argument in this section is simply 
that this temporal confluence is not a coincidence, but 
rather that the governmentalization has been driven in 
part by the private interests of “compliance” within 
and across firms, and that this growth creates a 
feedback loop in which the process of 
governmentalization increases over time. Putting aside 
issues of initial causality, once the process starts, 
increasing governmentalization begets more demand 
for compliance, which in turn fosters an interest in 
more rules and more government-like process. Given 
the importance of this feedback loop, as in other areas 
where feedback is important, the growth of compliance 
is unlikely to remain linear. And, in practice, we 
appear to be witnessing more explosive growth. 
8. Industry Structure 
A final potential influence on the nature and 
scope of SRO regulation is any change in industry 
structure. The nature of the underlying regulated 
industry will influence the shape of its self-regulatory 
structure, which will in turn influence the relationship 
with the government regulator. A consolidated 
industry structure, coupled with a single SRO is likely 
to lead to a different position vis-à-vis the ultimate 
government regulator than a more diffuse industry 
with multiple competing SROs. In other words, the 
nature of SROs is likely to reflect the fundamental 
industry structure. 
For example, the government agency may enjoy 
more control over a single SRO, since it can devote all 
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of its attention to it; the government agency might 
have more at stake if there is a single SRO, and 
therefore exert more influence on it; the government 
agency and the single SRO might work more closely 
together, and therefore the SRO might come to look 
more governmental; and so forth.  
On the other hand, one can imagine that with 
fewer options for exit to different SROs, and therefore a 
greater stake in the policies of a single SRO, industry 
members might have a greater stake in optimizing the 
SRO’s policies to meet their needs. While one might 
think this influence would be in the direction of a more 
pure self-regulatory model, the discussion above 
suggests this is not necessarily true. For instance, the 
public choice analysis of the compliance industry 
suggests that even firms that might otherwise prefer 
an SRO model ab initio might come to prefer a QGO 
over time. Although without more it is not entirely 
clear which way a change in industry structure cuts, 
combined with the factors mentioned above, 
consolidation is likely to lead to greater 
governmentalization. 
Over the past several decades there has been 
significant consolidation in the securities and 
commodities industry. While a full description of this 
history is beyond the scope this paper, the point can 
be made with some basic facts. There has been 
consolidation of the major stock exchanges, with the 
New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and CME Group 
buying rivals and building international dominance. 
The SROs have consolidated as well, with the most 
prominent example being the combination of the NASD 
(the regulator for over-the-counter securities 
transactions) and the SRO of the NYSE merging in 
2007 to create a single securities regulator known as 
FINRA.149 A final example of this trend is the recent 
congressional command in the Dodd-Frank Act that 
certain derivatives transactions be conducted on 
 
149 www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/2007/34-56145.pdf 
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centralized clearinghouses.150 In all these cases, the 
trend has been toward more consolidation and 
centralization, which has the effect of pushing towards 
a more governmentalized approach to self-regulation, 
under the reasonable assumptions described above.  
B. Implications for Other SROs 
The mechanisms that transform SROs into 
QGOs are not necessarily applicable in every case nor 
can they be applied mechanistically. The facts and 
circumstances for particular industries and SROs will 
determine whether particular mechanisms influence 
the nature and scope of regulation, whether a 
mechanism or combination of mechanisms transform 
an SRO into a QGO, and how quickly any such 
transformation will occur.  
In the commodities industry, for instance, we 
have described some instances in which 
governmentalization seems to be occurring, but there 
may be other factors at work that do not support or 
even counteract such a transformation. For instance, 
while the securities business has become a more retail 
business in which larger numbers of average 
individuals are betting greater amounts in an 
intermediated way, the commodities and derivatives 
markets do not clearly reflect a similar evolution. 
Obviously, derivatives have seen huge recent growth: 
the total value of all derivatives rose from $5,737 
billion in 1990 to an astonishing $687,811 billion by 
2009.151 But there is no good evidence to suggest that 
retail investors have driven this growth, as they have 
in the case of equities. This difference might suggest 
less pressure to move to a QGO model in derivatives. 
Of course, the commodities industry’s dramatic 
increase in size, alone, might suggest more systemic 
 
150 See Silla Brush, “CFTC Proposes Swaps Clearing Determinations Under Dodd-
Frank,” BLOOMBERG (Jul. 25, 2012), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-
25/cftc-proposes-swaps-clearing-determinations-under-dodd-frank-1-.html. 
151 See Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/scfindex.htm (page 98). 
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risks, which may in turn generate more demand for 
government-like regulation. The Dodd-Frank Act’s 
treatment of derivatives is perhaps one an example of 
this sentiment. In addition, a lesson of the 2008 
financial crisis may be that average investors are not 
the only ones who may need the protections of law, 
and thus merely the growth of the industry may be a 
factor favoring a more governmental approach to 
regulation.  
Another element to consider is the relation 
between the evolution of various SROs across 
industries. The evolution of the SRO in the securities 
industry from SRO to QGO might, for instance make a 
similar change in the commodities industry more 
likely. If FINRA is a viewed as a model for SROs, as its 
prominent position among them sometimes suggests, 
then as it changes, so too might other financial SROs. 
For instance, if an SRO in another industry, such as 
commodities or derivatives, experiences a regulatory 
failure, whether or not the SRO was efficient ex ante, 
then the baseline comparison in terms of regulatory 
approach will be with other leading SROs, like FINRA. 
Again, perception here may matter more than the 
provable linkage between structure and outcomes. 
Further more, as FINRA becomes more like the SEC, 
the agency may use that transformation as an example 
for other financial industries to follow. 
Based on our conjectures, we believe that the 
process of governmentalization is likely for other 
financial SROs. Of course we cannot be certain when 
such a transformation will happen, how fast it will 
occur, or what the primary impetus will be for the 
change, but our prediction is that these factors are a 
powerful influence on financial SROs. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASING GOVERNMENTALIZATION 
In the previous two sections of this article, we first 
detailed the phenomenon of a growing 
governmentalization of financial self-regulatory 
organizations and then explored the mechanisms that 
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appear most responsible for that transformation.  In 
this section, we consider the implications of increasing 
governmentalization of the SROs in our federal 
administrative structure. 
Certainly, in light of the performance and popular 
depiction of the U.S. and global financial markets over 
the past several years, some commentators may 
welcome any development that appears to increase the 
power of financial regulators, no matter what form it 
may take.  There is no shortage of critics of financial 
regulation generally and self-regulation specifically, 
many of whom prescribe just such a greater role for 
governmental actors. 
Indeed the new millennium’s opening decade 
featured a series of high-profile financial scandals and 
failures: from the hangover of the bursting 
dotcommery to the Enron and WorldCom accounting 
investigations to mutual fund market timing 
allegations to the mortgage meltdown and its 
accompanying 2008 global crisis.  Each of these cycles 
fostered public handwringing, prosecutorial 
investigations, and federal regulatory responses.  
Following several decades in which the original four 
securities statutes of the Great Depression dominated 
the legal landscape, the past ten years alone has given 
rise to several new landmark laws: Sarbanes-Oxley, 
Dodd-Frank, and the JOBS Act.  State financial 
regulators, too, have grown increasingly active in their 
investigation of financial dealings: then-New York 
Attorney General Elliot Spitzer gained renown as the 
Sheriff of Wall Street; today, his successor, Eric 
Schneiderman is investigating major financial 
institutions for their role in the mortgage debacle. 
Given this widespread and popular support for 
new investigations, new legislation, and new 
regulations to police financial behavior, we would fully 
expect at least some constituencies to applaud any 
increased governmentalization of financial self-
regulatory organizations.  In fact, to the extent some 
commentators may have believed SROs to be 
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intrinsically feeble institutions dominated by their 
members, this development may appear simply to be 
the necessary and obvious corrective to an inept 
original design.   
But we urge caution about the increasingly 
powerful and governmental SROs.  The implications of 
this evolution are troublesome, no matter what one’s 
disposition towards the regulation of financial 
markets.  Certainly, those who would prefer fewer 
governmental constraints upon the financial markets 
are necessarily going to be disappointed with a 
significant increase in those constraints.  But even 
those who welcome new financial legislation should 
not embrace greater SRO governmentalization as a 
self-evident good without considering what will be lost 
by the de facto elimination of true self-regulation in 
our financial markets.   
We see at least three significant concerns with 
ever-increasing govermentalization.  First, the loss of 
self-regulation prompts a recollection of what the 
benefits of self-regulation are and why, indeed, why 
the financial SROs were established in the first 
instance.  In a similar vein, Congress had compelling 
reasons to permit self-regulation to co-exist with – 
rather than to be replaced by – governmental 
regulatory authorities such as the SEC and CFTC.  
Second, commensurability in our system of regulatory 
authority is a compelling consideration: there are 
persuasive reasons to deploy softer power on some 
occasions and in some settings, rather than always to 
unleash the full power of the state.  Third, conversely, 
when every organ of our regulatory structure is 
imbued with the full authority of the state, then those 
citizens and institutions subject to that authority must 
be constitutionally entitled to the well-established 
panoply of protections that our democracy has long 
insured to check state authority. 
BECOMING THE FIFTH BRANCH 
 
64 
 
A.  Losing the Benefits of True Self-Regulation 
If financial SROs fully transform themselves 
entirely into governmental organs, then self-regulation 
in those spheres will be rendered extinct.  Any gains 
that governmental financial authority brings will, 
therefore, be offset by corresponding and potentially 
greater losses from the elimination of one of the 
financial industry’s oldest tools.  As lessons from 
biodiversity, drug-resistant diseases, and one-party 
rule teach, systems as complex and multivariate as the 
U.S. economy rarely benefit from a reduction in their 
diversity.  One size almost never fits all, so caution 
should accompany any elimination of additional 
potential methods of control.  As much as anyone 
might dearly enjoy chocolate, for instance, the perils of 
genetically modifying every plant into a cacao tree are 
readily envisioned.  If more governmental control of 
our financial system is desirable, the devices are 
already in place – through existing regulatory agencies 
– to ratchet up that control.  By converting structures 
that were not designed to operate as governmental 
actors, the unique attributes of those SROs that enrich 
the overall compliance landscape will be jettisoned.  
Indeed, the creation and preservation of SROs itself 
bespeak faith in their virtues.  There are good reasons 
why SROs were originally given their jurisdiction, and 
they should be considered at a time when SROs may 
be facing termination by transformation. 
Perhaps, however, one might contend that SROs 
have always been a compromise and that any creation 
of an SRO necessarily constituted a concession to 
overweening industry power.  Self-regulation, in such 
a view, is in fact the absence of any regulation and is 
evidence that the particular industry successfully 
rebuffed any oversight of its activities.  One would, in 
essence, be arguing that all financial operations ought 
to be overseen by entirely governmental regulatory 
agencies and that anything other than such oversight 
is an impotent alternative secured through political 
power and impure motives. 
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The compelling affirmative attributes of self-
regulation must therefore be considered, as these 
attributes will be abandoned in a bailiwick patrolled by 
only governmental or quasi-governmental authorities.  
As a first principle, self-regulation evokes the rich 
tradition of order without (or with minimal) law, 
explored and extolled in the work of Robert Ellickson 
and Lisa Bernstein.  We explore several of those 
benefits here. 
1. Industry Expertise 
  Perhaps the greatest single benefit that self-
regulation possesses over other forms of regulation is 
its access to direct industry expertise.  By capitalizing 
on the participation of industry players, a financial 
SRO can enjoy a greater degree of information and 
experience about the way in which financial 
transactions are actually performed in today’s 
incredibly sophisticated and specialized economy.  
Governmental actors, on the contrary, may be so far 
removed from day to day operations in this industry 
that their knowledge of financial practices may either 
be too theoretical or too outdated.   
  Indeed, one of the chief criticisms that emerged 
from post-mortems of the 2008 financial crisis was the 
fact that governmental regulators were woefully ill 
equipped to understand – let alone to monitor and to 
regulate effectively – the complicated financial 
machinations involved in, for instance, synthetic 
collateralized debt obligations. By more readily 
drawing upon the expertise, experience, and 
information of the regulated, SROs can reduce false-
positive and false-negative error costs and thereby 
reduce dead-weight losses from erroneous 
punishment.  
  At some level of our overall system, we must be 
able to gather information on how finance is actually 
practiced in our global economy.  By converting SROs 
into something else, we risk losing one of our only 
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links to this reality and becoming even more ignorant 
of the state of the art in financial engineering. 
2. Trust between the Regulating and Regulated 
  As any prosecutor knows, it is far easier to 
negotiate with and to monitor the actions of parties 
who share a degree of trust.  When an SRO’s 
membership and leadership truly represents industry 
participants, that trust will be a natural outgrowth of 
the familiarity the participants have with one another.  
The members of a community are likely to have greater 
trust of each other on specific issues than does the 
general polity at large. This trust will lead to greater 
common ground on issues such as the efficiency and 
justice of particular rules, therefore resulting less 
disagreement or deviation from expected behavior. 
  Where local compliance is possible without 
compulsion, the costs of governance are reduced.   
Conversely, when an entity charged with regulating 
and enforcing rules is staffed with people who report to 
the nation’s political capital, the distance between the 
regulator and the regulated grows quickly. 
3. Efficient Enforcement 
  With expertise and trust naturally comes efficiency 
and savings in the cost of operations.  When regulators 
know more about how a system actually works, they 
will be less inclined to waste resources educating 
themselves or making errors in regulation.  Similarly, 
if the regulated parties have faith in those who 
regulate them, they may be less inclined to challenge 
the process at every turn, to mount full-throated 
defenses, or to expend vast resources in checking the 
actions of the authorities.  SROs, then, are well 
understood to police a far broader swath of activities at 
comparably much lower cost. 
  Similarly, private law is less costly to create and to 
enforce in many situations. Almost by definition, the 
members of a smaller community, such as a particular 
industry or even an individual firm, are likely to share 
a greater alignment of interests and to be more 
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homogeneous along the dimension in which private 
law acts.  
4. Regulatory Subsidiarity 
  The values of benefits such as these are often 
considered in the design of large political systems, 
such as the European Union and the Catholic Church, 
and have long been celebrated through the theory of 
subsidiarity.  That theory posits that power should 
devolve to the lowest institution that is competent to 
exercise it.  Through such a federalist process, 
authority is kept as close as possible to the 
constituency that is being governed.   
  Private laws, whether they are designed for a 
family, a firm, or an industry, can be tailored by 
knowledgeable regulators to meet the particular local 
circumstances. Government rules, by contrast, more 
typically embody a one-size-fits-all nature, and 
therefore have the potential to be overinclusive, 
underinclusive, or both. For instance, a rule requiring 
boards of directors to be a particular size or bed time 
to be a certain hour might be optimal on average, but 
deviate wildly from optimality in the majority of actual 
applications. Private law imposed via subsidiarity may 
permit greater opportunity for individual firms or 
families to achieve their best local arrangements in 
ways that improve the total social welfare. Sometimes 
these rules might be broader than governmental law—
as in university rules prohibiting various forms of 
“hate” speech—and sometimes narrower—as in private 
associations that advocate certain types of religious or 
political viewpoints unpermitted in government 
settings. This tailoring principle is essentially the 
theoretical underpinning of federalism. But, 
government can only be so narrowly tailored, given the 
costs of creating and deploying governmental decision-
making.152 
 
152 For instance, the optimal speed limit likely differs by driver, but this is 
(currently) deemed too costly, so local authorities set speed limits by road 
section, subject of course to federal oversight and to prosecutorial discretion 
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B. Losing the Commensurability of Regulation 
  Comprehensive mosaics of interlocking oversight 
are richest when they most effectively calibrate their 
enforcement to the relevant infractions.  In our 
political system, we typically prefer traffic wardens to 
issue parking tickets, SWAT teams to resolve hostile 
domestic scenarios, and the military to defend our 
national interests abroad.  Our multilayered system of 
democracy would suffer gravely from the deployment 
of armed forces to enforce the minor ordinances that 
govern our quotidian activities.   
  Similarly, SROs that are truly self-regulatory can 
enrich the web of financial regulation by operating as 
the constables on patrol, carrying relatively minor 
tools to handle lesser infractions with lower stakes.  
Their elimination jeopardizes the ability to oversee 
minor financial infractions with an appropriately 
commensurate response.  If the only possible reaction 
to a financial transgression is the full force of the 
federal government or its quasi-governmental 
equivalent, we should expect unfortunate 
consequences. 
  First, such an overreaction obviously risks 
alienating the governed from their governors.  Citizens 
– or financial firms in the case of financial SROs – will 
quickly lose confidence in the judgment of a system 
that cannot discriminate between major and minor 
problems.  To the extent that participation in SROs is 
voluntary – if not technically then culturally – rational 
members of SROs will withdraw to the maximum 
extent possible from such an out-of-touch enforcement 
system.  If even the most minor of compliance errors 
can escalate into federal enforcement actions, then 
financial firms will be hard-pressed to treat their SROs 
as anything other than prosecutors who must be 
repelled with the maximum legal protections available. 
 
vested in the highway patrol.  
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  Second, if financial firms are forced into a 
defensive crouch and to don legal armor for every 
compliance issue, then the costs to regulation are 
likely to increase.  In such a hostile dynamic, there will 
be no such thing as informal enforcement.  Just as 
mobilizing the military to enforce speeding tickets 
would consume vastly more resources than the 
occasion warrants, turning every opportunity for 
financial compliance into a battle between federal 
regulators and private law firms will also require 
greater resources.  Of course, if greater resources are 
used, then fewer compliance matters can be addressed 
for the same budget, resulting in the ultimate 
undesired consequences: increasing the 
governmentalization of regulatory organizations could 
lead in a material decrease in regulatory oversight. 
  Another irony that might flow from the full 
governmentalization of SROs could be the realization 
subsequently that true self-regulation allowed for 
broader and more efficient regulation.  Thus, our 
system would attempt in future to reinvent what it had 
in the past: an industry-based partnership to monitor 
low-level compliance issues.  But, of course, 
establishing a new and trust self-regulatory absence 
after a wave of governmentalization would come with 
substantial cost and effort. 
C. The Need for Mandatory Constitutional Protections 
Academic commentators and courts have already 
noted that the phenomenon of increasing 
governmentalization of SROs is creating constitutional 
problems in the regulatory state. As SROs increasingly 
wield the power of the federal government, so too must 
they be restrained by constitutional checks on their 
authority.  That is, if members of SROs may be 
deprived of liberty by an organization that is acting 
under the color of governmental power, then they must 
also be protected by the constitutional mechanisms 
that ensure liberty in our political system.  
Maintaining this constitutional balance as SROs grow 
BECOMING THE FIFTH BRANCH 
 
70 
 
evermore governmental will require modifying our 
jurisprudence and, simultaneously, also add to the 
costs of this modified system of regulation. 
Scholars such as Roberta Karmel have noted that 
FINRA’s “increasingly government-like functions and 
operations raise the question of what checks and 
balances and due process procedures are necessary 
for such an SRO to have constitutional law 
accountability and administrative law legitimacy.”153  
Although there has been some dispute about what 
functions of SROs may constitute government-like 
activity, there is broad consensus that any activities 
that are government-like do in fact trigger the need for 
constitutional protections. 
Perhaps the threshold constitutional issue that 
arises from SROs transmogrifying into governmental 
entities is the consequence that such SROs might 
enjoy immunity from suit.  Indeed, Karmel concludes 
that “it would appear that FINRA will not have too 
much difficulty claiming immunity for its activities 
which would appear to be primarily, if not entirely, 
adjudicatory, prosecutorial or regulatory.”154  
Obviously, that sort of immunity would greatly alter 
the relationship between the organization and its 
members, very much to the latter’s detriment.   
But, on the member’s side of the ledger, they 
might increasingly be entitled to Fifth Amendment 
pleas in response to SRO requests for documentary or 
testamentary evidence.  Naturally, the reticence of 
members to cooperate with SRO investigations will 
obviously hamper investigations of wrongdoing. 
To the extent SROs are governmental entities, 
then the targets of their enforcement actions would 
also enjoy due process rights that could prove 
counterproductive to the SROs.  If every entity subject 
 
153 Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory 
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 
151, 154 (2008). 
154 Id. at 177. 
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to FINRA oversight were entitled to the full panoply of 
rights to notice, to statements of the charges against 
them, to full representation by counsel, to appeal, and 
so forth, then once again the costs of operating in this 
mode will increase for SROs.  Indeed, Karmel 
concludes that such developments “would probably 
ossify the work of the SROs and would not necessarily 
be useful.”155 
Of course, the transformation to governmental 
status does not affect only the regulated but also the 
regulator.  SROs that become true government 
agencies must themselves abide by the arcane and 
bountiful regulations that govern such entities.  That 
is, they would need to abide by regulations that 
constrain the ways in which they hire personnel, 
compensate their employees, and conduct their 
operations because of the applicability of laws such as 
the Freedom of Information Act and Administrative 
Procedure Act.  In short, SROs cannot indulge 
themselves of the attractive aspects of greater power 
over their subjects without themselves becoming 
entangled in the web of chains that keep us free.   
D. FINRA Rule 2010: An Example 
The most powerful and most commonly invoked 
FINRA rule is also perhaps the most vague. Rule 2010 
provides simply: “A member, in the conduct of its 
business, shall observe high standards of commercial 
honor and just and equitable principles of trade.”156 
Every violation of any other FINRA rule is almost by 
definition also a violation of Rule 2010, which raises 
the question of why the rule exists.157 One practical 
answer is that rule operates to capture conduct that 
 
155 Id. at 186. 
156 FINRA Rule 2010. Standards of Commercial Honor and Principles of 
Trade, available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_i
d=5504 (formerly NASD Rule 2110). 
157 Frank Thomas Devine, Exchange Act Rel. No. 46746, 202 SEC LEXIS 2780, at 
*21 (Oct. 30, 2002). 
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cannot be efficiently or easily proved to violate another 
rule, but that FINRA believes is worthy of sanction.  
Rules have necessary elements (such as, intent or 
scienter or the existence of a particular fact) that 
require proof, and FINRA rules are subjected to legal 
constraints by the SEC and federal courts. 
Accordingly, if FINRA alleges a broker engaged in 
“manipulation” of securities prices or illegal “churning” 
of a client’s account, FINRA must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that all the elements of 
manipulation or churning are satisfied. This 
prosecutorial burden is disciplined by the fact that any 
member can appeal a FINRA adjudicatory outcome to 
the SEC, then to the federal courts, and even to the 
Supreme Court.  
Proving all the elements of other rules, such as 
those proscribing manipulation, is costly and may be 
difficult in the brokerage context because of the 
ambiguity between desirable/legal conduct and 
undesirable/illegal conduct. Manipulation is a good 
example. Although it is a widespread belief that 
brokers are capable of manipulating prices, and that 
their doing so would be a bad thing for investors, 
drawing the line between manipulation and more 
benign trading is exceedingly difficult. Courts have 
struggled to develop workable definitions,158 and 
academics have wondered whether any precise 
definitions are possible.159 But, FINRA members 
charged with overseeing the discipline of other FINRA 
members possess an informed experience, which 
allows them to identify acceptable and unacceptable 
trading behavior at a more impressionistic level. 
Proving “manipulation” may be difficult, but brokers 
can fairly easily distinguish between good and bad 
broker behavior in a particular case.160 
 
158  
159 See Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, “Should the Law Prohibit ‘Manipulation’ 
in Financial Markets?,” 105  HARV. L. REV. 503 (1991). 
160 The best analogy here is Justice Stewart’s definition of obscenity –“I know it when 
I see it”—in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring). The problem 
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In such cases, Rule 2010 demonstrates its 
prosecutorial appeal. The rule allows members 
appointed to discipline other members to levy penalties 
against brokers who engage in socially undesirable 
conduct, which might otherwise be too difficult or 
costly to prove violates other, more specific rules. A 
general, ethical rule like this is especially important 
because brokers with knowledge of other specific rules 
can use the specifics as a roadmap to facilitate 
evasion. In other words, the vagueness of Rule 2010 is 
its power, in that it lowers monitoring and enforcement 
costs, as well as provides a broad net to catch bad 
brokers who would escape punishment in a more 
formalistic environment. 
Importantly, a vague, ethical rule like 2010 may 
be peculiarly within the power of a SRO to use. To 
tolerate the use of such a powerful and ill-defined rule, 
members must have faith that the discretion it grants 
to those sitting in judgment will be exercised wisely. 
Behind the veil of ignorance, self-regulated brokers 
might be more likely to agree to be bound by such a 
rule than if the discretion were to be exercised by non-
industry members, such as government agents. 
Reciprocity might potentially constrain abuse, and 
brokers might have greater faith in the expertise of 
industry members. Whatever the reasons, the loss of a 
powerful ethical rule would increase monitoring, 
enforcement, and adjudication costs, as well as the 
possibility of greater social losses in the event that 
more undesirable conduct will occur. 
William Douglas made a similar point in his 
famous speech to the Hartford Bond Club noted above. 
As Douglas described it, some undesirable conduct is 
“too minute for satisfactory [government] control” and 
some unethical conduct is lies “beyond the periphery 
of the law,” such that it can be reached only by self-
 
with such vague definitions in specialized areas is that their application by generalist judges 
may produce uncertainty in the minds of primary market participants, which results in 
increased costs. 
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regulation.161 Rule 2010 is an example of this kind of 
powerful, extra-legal rule, the absence of which might 
undermine the efficient enforcement of broker 
behavior. 
V. ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR SROS 
 If the increasing governmentalization of SROs is a 
problem, then what possible means might be deployed 
to halt or to reverse the unwelcome progress of this 
mutation?  At least three different approaches might 
be worth considering: directly overturning regulatory 
interventions; indirectly addressing the mechanisms 
that have led to those regulatory interventions; and 
cultivating new mechanisms that may tend to produce 
more independent and self-regulatory SROs. 
 A. Reversing the Series of Regulatory Interventions 
 First, one might attempt to reinstate the “self” in 
self-regulatory organizations simply by imposing 
independence by fiat.  That is, the Congress or the 
relevant administrative agencies could, respectively 
enact legislation or promulgate regulation that 
insulates financial SROs from governmental oversight.  
In essence, this step would involve repealing those 
incremental measures adopted (and set forth in 
Section II above) over the past few decades that have 
most decisively pulled SROs into the governmental 
orbit. So, for instance, the composition of SRO 
governing boards could be revised to allow a greater 
representation of the industries themselves.  Similarly, 
the mechanisms by which agencies currently approve 
or disapprove of regulations and enforcement actions 
of SROs could be formally severed.   
 While this approach is direct and would likely 
achieve the most immediate de-governmentalization of 
SROs, it suffers for ignoring the cause and effect of the 
changes in SROs.  As we have shown in this article, a 
variety of mechanisms has evolved to generate the 
 
161 See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 6 at 186. 
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increasing governmentalization of SROs – any attempt 
to alter the product of those mechanisms could simply 
be reversed once again by the inexorable workings of 
those mechanisms in future. 
 If the political will is not available for these direct 
measures, as our survey of the mechanisms producing 
greater governmentalization suggests, then a deeper 
approach will be necessary.   
 B. Halting the Mechanisms of Governmentalization 
 A second approach, therefore, would be to attempt 
to effect change at the level of the particular 
mechanisms that we have described in Section III of 
this article.  Of course, this technique would require a 
broad variety of efforts, put forth in some unknowable 
combination, in order to achieve a satisfying result.   
 Certain mechanisms, of course, may simply be 
beyond any regulatory remedy.  The increasingly 
individualistic nature of investors in the financial 
markets together with their increasing exposure to 
greater losses, for instance, are profound changes 
being driven by massive paradigm shifts in our 
retirement system.  As employers, both public and 
private, adopt defined contribution plans in the place 
of defined benefit plans, we will continue to see fewer 
professionally managed pension plans and greater 
numbers of individually managed retirement accounts.  
A few prototypes have recently emerged, however, that 
might reverse this development.  In one such example, 
retirees in California are voluntarily enrolling in 
private plans that mimic the organizational structure 
of pension plans: that is, participants can combine 
their private accounts into a greater plan, managed by 
professionals, to take advantage of economies of scale 
and expertise.  To the extent these pilot programs 
expand, they could reduce the direct exposure of 
individuals to loss and thereby reduce the need – or 
perceived need – for greater governmental control over 
financial regulation. 
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 The one-way ratchet mechanisms are extremely 
difficult to counteract, inasmuch as they appears to be 
driven by psychological heuristics and biases that give 
greater attention and weight to failures than to 
successes.  Since those failures are almost always 
more salient to investors, the media, and governmental 
authorities, it will be difficult to prevent authorities 
from overreacting to them.  Of course, these sorts of 
overreactions are common across the law, whether it 
be shark bites, terrorist attacks, or disease outbreaks: 
authorities regularly have their cost-benefit analyses 
challenged by rare but dramatic events.  One measure 
that can be deployed to counter these effects is, 
however modest, to draw attention to them.  A great 
deal of recent psychological literature attempts to 
counter deleterious financial decisions primarily by 
alerting people to those choices, in the hope that 
greater awareness will dampen those effects. 
 To the extent that individual regulators or entire 
compliance industry’s appear to be arrogating power to 
themselves by promoting more governmental 
regulation, certain steps can be taken.  First, 
prohibitions on the revolving door between industry 
and regulation attempt to address this process at the 
individual level.  Perhaps disclosure measures can be 
introduced to compute the additional number of 
compliance professionals that any new regulations will 
require.  Publicizing this number might draw attention 
to the ways in which increasingly governmental 
regulation benefits the compliance industry. 
 C. Cultivating Regulatory Competition 
 A third approach would be to try to foster a market 
solution to the problem.  If the number of SROs 
operating in any particular financial sector could be 
increased, then the dynamics of competition might 
work to produce something closer to an optimal blend 
of “self” in self-regulatory organizations.  If any one 
SRO were to grow too governmental for the tastes of its 
constituency, then that organization would lose 
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market share and thereby be disciplined into altering 
its approach.  Competition, of course, requires more 
than one SRO in any given field.  Unfortunately, the 
costs of establishing SROs are high and, indeed, 
possibly prohibitive without governmental subsidy.  
According to a report by Boston Consulting Group, the 
start-up costs of creating a new SRO might be as high 
as $300 million.  Indeed, the investment advisory 
industry is currently resisting the creation of an SRO 
in some part because of the financial burden such a 
new institution would impose upon their firms.  
Similarly, there might be high switching costs to 
members that would prohibit free movement from one 
SRO to another, and such movement would be vital to 
imposing market discipline upon each SRO.  Finally, 
there might be a dearth of expertise available to staff 
and manage multiple financial SROs across the 
economy. 
 If there is value to regulatory competition, then it 
might be worth revisiting the approval of the merger of 
the NYSE and NASD regulatory arms to create FINRA. 
Efficiency reasons, such as having a single set of rules, 
a single enforcer, and so on, justified the merger, and 
these are likely real and significant. But there is an 
offsetting cost to the consolidation that might have 
been underappreciated at the time. If we are correct 
that there FINRA is becoming increasingly 
governmental in its regulatory approach, and if the 
costs of this change cannot be checked by an 
alternative source of regulatory oversight, then we can 
be less confident in the efficiency of the regulatory 
model. If a regulator becomes inefficient, for whatever 
reason, and the regulated have the choice to switch 
regulators, this provides a check on regulatory 
overreach. (This is a race-to-the-top story of regulatory 
competition, which is not the only possibility.) We 
cannot be confident that the problem we’ve identified 
in this article would be sufficient to warrant undoing 
the creation of FINRA, and we are certain the political 
will to do so now is lacking. But if the 
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governmentalization of FINRA continues, and some 
change is necessary, going back to multiple broker 
SROs might be an option worth considering. 
 But the impediments to increasing competition 
amongst SROs domestically do not necessarily rule out 
all possible sources of competition.  As we have seen in 
other financial areas, international markets are a 
broader source of regulatory arbitrage.  If a greater 
array of SROs is desired but unaffordable within the 
United States, then Congress and the financial 
administrative agencies should permit financial firms 
to choose amongst international SROs.  As financial 
markets grow in size and sophistication in Asian and 
European markets, they might produce additional 
regulatory – and self-regulatory – institutions that 
might carry some of the burden of regulating U.S. 
entities.  Of course, U.S. authorities would first have to 
agree to accede to the authority of those foreign 
institutions.  We hope to have provided some 
rationales for reclaiming greater self-regulation of our 
financial markets, wherever that self-regulation can be 
found.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have attempted to enrich the 
academic focus upon self-regulation in the U.S. 
financial markets.  Notwithstanding the enormous 
degree of academic output following the recent 
financial scandals and crises, relatively little of that 
work has focused upon the actual first point of contact 
between financial firms and regulators: self-regulatory 
organizations.  Traditionally, Congress and the 
financial agencies receive greatest attention, despite 
the reality that self-regulatory organizations are the 
primary constables on patrol in this field.   
Much of the scholarship on self-regulation that 
does exist, however, acknowledges that SROs have 
along certain axes adopted notably governmental 
traits.  That work tends to consider the constitutional 
implications of such a development, without 
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examining why it is occurring.  We have attempted to 
rectify that oversight by examining why the process of 
governmentalization may be occurring and what it is 
costing us.  Without understanding the mechanisms 
that are driving governmentalization, we will have a 
difficult time addressing or reversing the process.  Our 
primary purpose, therefore, has been to explore those 
processes in an effort to enrich our understanding of a 
phenomenon that is vital to any effort to regulate our 
financial system effectively. 
We have proposed some possible approaches to 
reverse the process of governmentalization in SROs, 
directly, indirectly, and through the use of 
countervailing market forces, but devising true 
solutions will be the charge of future scholarship. 
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